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ABSTRACT 
 
Policymakers and advocates of food sovereignty alike argue that the trade agreements to which 
Canada is a party restrict the potential to develop government-sponsored local food policies; however, 
there is growing academic support for the view that there is some latitude in the agreements that can be 
exploited through creative legislative drafting. Using the Canadian Environmental Law Association’s 
(CELA) proposed Model Local Food Bill for Ontario as a case study, this paper argues that by integrating 
local and sustainable measures, policymakers may be able to develop local food programs without 
violating Canada’s trade commitments. Recommendations are made as to how the Model Bill could be 
modified so as to further food sovereignty goals while evading trade complaints; these recommendations 
are categorized as efficiency, substitution, or redesign stage initiatives, to identify the challenges of 
implementing each of the measures if they were to be included in a modified bill. Though one of the goals 
of this paper was to propose specific language for each of the measures, the nature of trade disputes and 
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My overarching goal upon completion of the MES program, as indicated in my Plan of Study 
(POS), was to understand how international laws can affect domestic policy choices, specifically in the 
realm of food policy. My Major Paper (MRP) has allowed me to examine this in a concrete way by 
studying international trade law and policy, and how a number of multilateral commitments have affected 
Ontario’s ability to make decisions in relation to local food production, distribution and procurement. This 
topic considers the intersection of my three components (international law, public policy analysis, and the 
global food system), and has given me further understanding of the process of developing legislation and 
making legislative decisions, which has been valuable for me in my capacity as a joint JD student. 
Through researching and writing my MRP, I believe that I was able to accomplish a number of the 
learning objectives that I set out in my POS. I was able to examine the impact of hard legal instruments, 
specifically international trade treaties, on domestic lawmaking in the realm of food; though I did not 
directly analyze the compliance aspect of these treaties, I did observe the effect that a desire for 
compliance can have on domestic policymaking, and the role of trade agreements as one barrier to policy 
implementation. Further, using CELA’s Model Bill allowed me to see the role that non-governmental 
organizations can have (or at least attempt to have) on policymaking. I was also able to synthesize my 
understanding of the global food system, and the distinctions between the conventional supply chain and 
alternative models that have arisen in response to its failings; this resulted in my support for food 
sovereignty as opposed to other alternative paradigms. Finally, though my paper does not specifically 
examine the citizen perspective of public policy decisions in relation to food, it does address how they can 









Over the past few decades and, in particular, since the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995, trade liberalization for all goods and services, including food products, has increased 
exponentially. As a consequence, domestic policies and programs have progressively been impacted by 
international obligations, and many policymakers believe that the innumerable trade agreements preclude 
them from creating measures that promote the local food system; this can have a detrimental effect on 
the livelihoods of local producers as well as consumers. Consequently, champions of food sovereignty, or 
simply localism generally, often argue that the only way to improve local food initiatives is to withdraw 
from the trade agreements or completely redesign them. However, a growing group of academics argue 
that there is much more leeway in these trade agreements that would allow for government-sponsored 
local food policies.  
Most of the academic work regarding compliance with trade agreements has been focused on eco-
labeling schemes and organic certification.1 With respect to local food policies and programmes, very little 
work has been done on how to create these without running afoul of the trade agreements; however, 
MacRae argues that by combining local and sustainable initiatives, conflicts with Canada’s trade 
commitments may be avoided.2 By integrating the two types of measures, he asserts that more 
exemptions may be found within the trade agreements and there may be fewer accusations of 
discrimination from other Member States.3  
This paper builds on MacRae’s argument; it analyses a number of Canada’s interprovincial and 
international trade commitments, particularly the WTO agreements, and attempts to show that they are 
not inherently incompatible with the creation of government and para-government-facilitated and -funded 
local food policies and programs. This, the argument goes, would advance food sovereignty. In the words 
                                                
1 See e.g. Carsten Daugbjerg, “The World Trade Organization and Organic Food Trade: Potential for Restricting Protectionism?” 
(2012) 2:1 Organic Agriculture, 55; Alan Swinbank, “Like Products, Animal Welfare and the World Trade Organization” (2006) 40:4  
JL of World Trade 687; Erich Vranes, “Climate Labeling and the WTO: the 2010 EU Ecolabelling Programme as a Test Case Under 
WTO law” in Christoph Hermann & Jörg Phillipp Terhechte, eds, European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 2 (2), 
(Springer, Berlin, 2011) 205. 
2 Rod MacRae, “Do Trade Agreements Substantially Limit Development of Local/Sustainable Food Systems in Canada?” (2014) 1:1 
Canadian Food Studies 103. 
3 Ibid. 
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of Sustain Ontario, “The Law Leaves Room for Local Food”4; this paper attempts to demonstrate how it 
does so using the Canadian Environmental Law Association’s (CELA) proposed Model Local Food Bill for 
Ontario.5 This Model Bill was created to be a basis upon which the government of Ontario could create its 
own Local Food Act, and was “designed as a comprehensive approach to encourage local food 
development and ecologically sound farming practices in Ontario.”6 The Bill focuses primarily on local 
food distribution and procurement, and the establishment of local food education programs within 
schools.  
For my analysis, I performed qualitative research by means of a legal textual analysis, similar to the 
approach taken by Vranes.7 Whereas Vranes examined the European Union’s 2010 Ecolabelling 
Programme through a WTO lens, I analyzed key features of CELA’s Model Bill within a food sovereignty 
framework and through the lens of a number of key trade agreements. Specifically, I evaluated the Bill’s 
contents with respect to the tenets of food sovereignty, and inquired as to how it could be altered to 
further these goals. I then engaged in a review of various agreements of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), and the Canada-European 
Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which is awaiting ratification. In order to 
understand more thoroughly what the debates are around relevant provisions of the agreements, I 
examined past dispute panels and academic commentary. I then explored ways that the Model Bill could 
be altered in order to accommodate Canada’s trade commitments, while upholding the “local” aspect of 
the Act. Finally, I categorized my recommendations as either efficiency, substitution, or redesign stage 
initiatives, following Hill and MacRae’s Efficiency-Substitution-Redesign transition framework.8  
  
                                                
4 Sustain Ontario, Media Release, “The Law Leaves Room for Local Food” (27 February 2015) online: 
<http://sustainontario.com/2015/02/27/26028/news/media-release-the-law-leaves-room-for-local-food>. 
5 Canadian Environmental Law Association, Ontario Local Food Act, 2013: A model bill. (Toronto, ON: CELA, 2013), online: CELA 
<http://s.cela.ca/files/891ModelLocalFoodBill_0.pdf> [Model Bill]. 
6 Canadian Environmental Law Association, Media Release, “Model Local Food Act sets out much needed support for Ontario’s 
local food systems” (27 February 2013) online: CELA <http://www.cela.ca/sites/cela.ca/files/MR270213_0.pdf>. 
7 Vranes, supra note 1. 
8 Stuart B Hill & Rod J MacRae, “Conceptual Framework for the Transition from Conventional to Sustainable Agriculture” (1996) 7 JL 
Sustainable Agriculture 81. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF FOOD SYSTEMS DISCOURSES & FOOD SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A. Neoliberalism and the Corporate Food Regime 
The reigning trade paradigm of the day is neoliberalism, a political economic theory that asserts, 
“human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade.”9 Neoliberalism promotes the retreat of state intervention, enabling unprecedented corporate 
control over the decision-making processes that affect citizens. The concomitant discourse in food 
systems is an “industrial and corporate-led model of agriculture.”10  
The corporate food regime “aims at the removal of social and political barriers to the free flow of 
capital in food and agriculture and is institutionalized through international agreements such as the 
WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture.”11 As Skogstad indicates, “at virtually every component in the food 
supply chain, the trend is towards fewer and larger enterprises.”12 This trend has meant that the global 
food system has become more integrated both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal integration refers to 
corporate concentration at a single stage of the system; vertical integration refers to the corporate 
concentration of multiple stages i.e. one firm completes multiple steps in the supply chain.13 Integration 
happens not only locally, but also across borders: transnational companies will control many parts of the 
supply system around the globe. Thus, Kloppenburg, Hendrickson, and Stevenson argue that the global 
food system is both centralized – in the sense that food is grown in fewer areas, on fewer farms, and 
processed and sold by fewer transnational corporations – and decentralized – in the sense that 
production is widely dispersed around the globe, and both production and processing of food often takes 
place far away from where it is ultimately consumed.14  
                                                
9 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 2. 
10 Annette Aurélie Desmarais, “Building Food Sovereignty: A Radical Framework for Alternative Food Systems” in Mustafa Koç, 
Jennifer Sumner & Anthony Winson, eds, Critical Perspectives in Food Studies (Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 2012) 359. 
11 Madeleine Fairbairn, “Framing Resistance: International Food Regimes & the Roots of Food Sovereignty” in Hannah Wittman, 
Annette Aurélie Desmarais, & Nettie Wiebe, eds, Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community (Black Point, NS: 
Fernwood, 2010) 15 at 18. 
12 Grace Skogstad, “Introduction: Internationalization and Canadian agriculture: Policy and governing paradigms” in 
Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture: Policy and Governing Paradigms (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008) 3 
at 17 [Skogstad, “Introduction”]. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Jack Kloppenburg Jr, John Hendrickson & GW Stevenson, “Coming in to the Foodshed” (1996) 13:3 Agriculture and Human 
Values 33. 
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The corporate food regime also encourages economies of scale (where higher levels of production 
mean cheaper production) and transnational corporations tend to favour areas where labour is cheap and 
weather is relatively constant year-round.15 Skogstad points out that this has led to competition among 
governments who wish to attract foreign firms, and that these governments often will only provide 
assistance to farmers whom they believe are competitive in an international trade sense.16  
In order for the corporate model to function, States have been required to expand their trade 
obligations as they relate to the production, processing, and consumption of food. As Wiebe and Wipf 
note, the “inclusion of agriculture in [GATT] negotiations, articulated in the [WTO], put official government 
stamps on decades of economic policies based on the globalization of a neoliberal, industrial, capital-
intensive and corporate-led model of agriculture.”17 These policies have resulted in “widespread loss of 
control over food markets, environments, land and rural cultures” for rural communities.18  
However, some academics remain sceptical about the effect that trade agreements have had on 
agricultural policies. Skogstad, for example, asserts that despite the programmatic changes that have 
taken place in Canadian agricultural policy (and which can be linked to international trade agreements 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)), the state assistance paradigm still 
prevails.19 The state assistance paradigm arose after the Second World War, and is rooted in the notion 
that “agriculture [is] an exceptional economic sector” requiring governmental regulation and financial 
subsidies.20 In the Canadian context, this notion manifested itself in the establishment of “farmer income 
safety nets,” the supply-managed sectors, and the former single-desk Canadian Wheat Board.21 Because 
these types of programs still exist in Canada, Skogstad argues that the market liberal paradigm 
(neoliberal) has not become dominant.22 It is worth noting, however, that the Canadian Wheat Board’s 
monopsony has since been disassembled in the name of freer trade, thus showing the ascendancy of the 
corporate-led model. 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Supra note 12.  
17 Nettie Wiebe & Kevin Wipf, “Nurturing food sovereignty in Canada” in Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurélie Desmarais, & Nettie 
Wiebe, eds, Food Sovereignty in Canada: Creating Just and Sustainable Food Systems (Black Point, NS: Fernwood, 2011) 1 at 3. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Grace Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs and Paradigms: The Influence of International Trade Agreements and 
Domestic Factors” (2008) 56:4 Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 493 [Skogstad, “Canadian Agricultural Programs”]. 
20 Ibid at 495. 
21 Ibid at 500. 
22 Supra note 19. 
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Regardless of whether the market liberal approach has actually overtaken the state assistance 
paradigm, it is obvious that the food regime as a whole has trended towards market-control. In response 
to this trend, a number of movements have emerged: the first global reaction arose in 1947 with the 
arrival of the “right to food” discourse; this was followed closely by talk of “food security”; and, more 
recently, “food sovereignty” has surfaced as the dominant critique of agribusiness. Each of these is 
explored below. 
 
B. The Right to Food  
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was signed.23 Though not binding, it 
was the first document that recognized the existence of human rights in practical terms. However, it was 
not until 1966 that these rights were formally recognized through the development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).24 The former recognizes personal integrity rights, rights of due process, and 
political rights, while the latter addresses distributive justice and social equity (including the right to food, 
which is articulated in Article 11). These covenants came into force in 1976; however, the rights they 
inscribe only become law when ratified by their signatories.  
ICESCR has been criticized generally by academics as being ‘weak’ in the sense that it merely 
proclaims that every State “undertakes to take steps” towards “achieving progressively” the rights that it 
sets in place.25 This is problematic for ensuring that citizens’ right to food has been met, especially 
because each State only has the obligation to take steps within “the maximum of its available resources” 
to ensure compliance with the treaty.26 If a treaty breach cannot be identified, it cannot be remedied and 
thus there is no enforcement for the right to food. Nonetheless, Fairbairn notes that, despite the fact that 
neither of these international accords have any enforcement mechanisms, “they create a legal precedent 
within the ratifying countries, which allows citizens or courts to charge states with the obligations to 
                                                
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810, (1948) 71. 
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Can TS 1976 No 47 (entered into force 
23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 1976 No 46 (entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) 
[ICESCR]. 
25 Ibid, Art 2(1). 
26 Ibid. 
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ensure adequate food in situations in which citizens are unable to secure it for themselves.”27 However, 
because the right to food is framed as a positive right (i.e. States must proactively ensure that it is fulfilled, 
rather than merely passively ensuring that it is not interfered with), States have been far less inclined to 
ensure that it has been met, thus undermining the ability to create legal precedent. At present, Canada 
has not recognized the human right to food constitutionally, legislatively, or through any programs or 
policies. It is, in part, because of the retreat of state intervention that food advocates shifted away from 
rights talk following the 1972-73 World Food Crisis.28 
 
C. Food Security 
Along with the right to food discourse, the roots of what is now known as “food security” emerged in 
the 1940s. In 1945, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) was created; 
its first Director-General was Sir John Boyd Orr, a Nobel Prize-winning nutritionist who publicized the 
state of world hunger.29 Fairbairn asserts that the food security framework emerged on a global scale at 
the World Food Conference in 1974.30  
Food security is a term often used to describe a condition wherein all members of a society have 
constant access (including physical, economic and social access) to acceptable food.31 One school of 
thought asserts that, in order to achieve food security, sufficient food must be available and accessible, 
both physically and economically.32 Moreover, food must be adequately nutritious, safe for eating, and 
culturally acceptable.33 Finally, there must be “policies and processes that enable the achievement of 
food security” (i.e. agency to ensure that it is realized).34 Though there are numerous conceptions of food 
security, many of the dominant ones “[emphasize] national level supplies, and the major factors involved 
                                                
27Supra note 11 at 20. 
28 Fairbairn, supra note 11. 
29 D John Shaw, World Food Security: A History Since 1945 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), online: 
<http://observatorioseguridadalimentaria.org/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/Shaw_A_History_of_Food_Security_since_19
45_2007.pdf>. 
30 Supra note 11 at 22. 
31 Elizabeth A Dowler & Deirdre O'Connor, “Rights Based Approaches to Addressing Food Poverty and Food Insecurity in Ireland 
and UK” (2012) 74:1 Social Science and Medicine 44. 
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are national imports and production levels.”35 In practice, this means a country can be considered ‘food 
secure’ when its citizens are, in fact, ‘food insecure,’ due to inadequate access.36 
Despite the significance of national levels, food security has been criticized as shifting away from 
state intervention in the marketplace towards concentration on the individual purchasing power of 
citizens, thus giving priority to markets over social welfare, and giving more power to corporations.37 As 
such, some conceptions have been condemned for having been overtaken by the dominant neoliberal 
paradigm. Other conceptions of food security have become popular due to their compatibility with the 
dominant paradigm: for example, some academics have pointed towards a number of labelling programs, 
including fair trade and organic, which “rely on a neoliberal discourse of consumerism, personal 
responsibility and choice, thereby contributing to the normalization of neoliberalism.”38  
This understanding of certain food security discourses posits escalating production and increasing 
imports as the solution to the fundamental problems of the agri-food system; alternatively, food 
sovereignty provides a more relational approach, where food is not viewed solely as a commodity to be 
traded in the global market.39 Food sovereignty has thus been seen as a better critique of the dominant 
neoliberal model than the most popular conceptions of food security, which commentators argue fail to 
address the power imbalances inherent in the agri-food system.40 
 
D. Food Sovereignty 
The concept of food sovereignty first appeared on the international scene in 1996: La Via 
Campesina, a self-proclaimed “transnational peasant movement,” used the term at the World Food 
Summit that year to describe an alternative framework for agri-food systems. Madeleine Fairbairn asserts, 
“food sovereignty is both a reaction to and an intellectual offspring of the earlier concepts of the ‘right to 
food’ and ‘food security’.”41 However, as opposed to the two movements that preceded it, this frame 
resists the agribusiness model. Wittman, Desmarais, and Wiebe define food sovereignty as “the right of 
                                                
35 Fairbairn, supra note 11 at 23. 
36 See e.g. discussions on food deserts: Kristian Larsen & Jason Gilliland, “Mapping the Evolution of 'Food Deserts' in a Canadian 
city: Supermarket Accessibility in London, Ontario, 1961–2005,” (2008) 7:16 Int’l JL of Health Geographics,  doi: 10.1186/1476-
072X-7-16. 
37 Desmarais, supra note 10. 
38 Fairbairn, supra note 11 at 19. 
39 Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurélie Desmarais & Nettie Wiebe, (2010). The Origins & Potential of Food Sovereignty” in Wittman, 
Desmarais & Wiebe, supra note 11, 1. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Supra note 11 at 15 [emphasis added]. 
PURSUING FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN CANADA AMIDST THE TRADE AGREEMENTS  9 
 
 
nations and peoples to control their own food systems, including their own markets, production modes, 
food cultures and environments.”42 Though it is also a rights-based approach, it does not focus solely on 
availability and accessibility; rather, food sovereignty emphasizes the right of farmers and consumers to 
be part of the decision-making process for policies that affect them.43 Wiebe and Wipf argue that 
“community-based control over the food system” is necessary to ensure both “sustainable food production 
and genuine food security,” which they say are the markers of food sovereignty.44 Self-determination, self-
sufficiency, and participation are thus central for the realization of food sovereignty. 
In 2007, the Nyéléni International Forum for Food Sovereignty was held in Mali. There were five 
hundred participants in attendance, representing a variety of movements – peasant, pastoralist, and 
social, to name a few – from around the world.45 The outcome of the forum was the Peoples’ Food 
Sovereignty Statement, a declaration that sought to elucidate the meaning of food sovereignty after a 
decade of uncertainty. The Statement asserts that production of food must be community-based, and that 
food sovereignty is rooted in the rights of people to have control over their food systems.46 Wiebe and 
Wipf assert that strategies for achieving food sovereignty must be developed at every level – local, 
regional, and national; they argue that one uniform model of food sovereignty cannot be established and 
transferred between locales.47 Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe also attest to the need for “home grown” 
approaches to agri-food systems, and argue that food sovereignty “requires developing appropriate 
strategies for change within our own array of unique political, cultural and ecological domains.”48  
There was consensus at the Nyéléni forum for the need to remove any barriers separating 
production operations from consumption, and to base production methods on local knowledge.49 Wiebe 
and Wipf also assert that one of the key tactics to realizing food sovereignty is a shift to alternative modes 
of production50: although conventional agricultural systems are highly productive, they are both unstable 
                                                
42 Supra note 39 at 2. 
43 Desmarais, supra note 10. 
44 Supra note 17 at 5. 
45 Wittman, Desmarais & Wiebe, supra note 39. 
46 Peoples’ Food Sovereignty Statement. (2007) online: Nyéléni 
<http://www.nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/Peoples_Food_Sovereignty_Statement.pdf>. 
47 Supra note 17. 
48 Supra note 39 at 5. 
49  Wittman, Desmarais & Wiebe, supra note 39. 
50 Supra note 17. 
PURSUING FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN CANADA AMIDST THE TRADE AGREEMENTS  10 
 
 
and unsustainable.51 According to Altieri, one precondition to food sovereignty is a move towards regional 
agroecological approaches to agricultural production, which have been shown to improve productivity on 
small-scale farms, as well as seed sovereignty for farmers.52 This is because both food sovereignty and 
agroecological frameworks have a focus on “local autonomy, local markets, local production-consumption 
cycles, energy and technological sovereignty, and farmer-to-farmer networks.”53 
Agroecology is a science that applies “ecological concepts and principles to the design and 
management of sustainable agroecosytems”54; it has thus been deemed “the science of sustainable 
agriculture.”55 Agroecological systems are generated so that producers can grow food without depending 
greatly on synthetic chemicals (pesticides, fertilizers, etc.) and fossil fuels; the goal is for such systems to 
promote natural processes, relying on internal ecological processes. In other words, agroecological 
systems are designed to be both productive and sustaining, with Hecht calling them “semi-domesticated 
systems” on the scale of human intervention – they are not natural, but they are not industrial either.56 
Agroecological systems substitute conventional farming practices with more traditional techniques 
but updated with our new understanding of ecological processes. These include: the planting of 
polycultures, rather than monocultures; the use of crop rotations; the employment of agroforestry 
techniques to increase biodiversity; and using knowledge and management approaches to pest, disease, 
soil, and weed management.57 Norgaard and Sikor point to the growing gap “between social and 
ecological processes”, and the ever-widening gap between consumers and producers58; agroecological 
approaches seek to bridge this divide by engaging in more sustainable practices. In order to be truly 
sustainable, Altieri argues that systems must: be regionally appropriate and participatory; contribute to the 
social justice movement; and restore biodiversity.59 The Toronto Food Policy Council (TFPC) similarly 
                                                
51 Richard B Norgaard & Thomas O Sikor, “The Methodology and Practice of Agroecology” in Miguel A Altieri, ed, Agroecology: The 
Science of Sustainability, 2nd ed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) 21. 
52 Miguel A Altieri, “Scaling Up Agroecological Approaches for Food Sovereignty in Latin America” in Wittman, Desmarais, & Wiebe, 
supra note 11, 120. 
53 Ibid at 129. 
54 Ibid at 121. 
55 Miguel A Altieri, ed, Agroecology: The Science of Sustainability, 2nd ed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 
56 Susanna B Hecht, “The Evolution of Agroecological Thought” in Altieri, supra note 51, 1 at 5. 
57 Altieri, supra note 55. 
58 Supra note 51 at 28. 
59 Supra note 55. 
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asserts that there are four key characteristics of an agroecosystem: it must be productive, sustainable, 
equitable, and provide a stable output.60  
 
i. Food Sovereignty in Canada 
The realization of food sovereignty is, evidently, location-specific. With this in mind, Wiebe and 
Wipf consider the barriers to realizing food sovereignty in Canada, including: the diminishing number of 
farmers in the country; the fact that Canada was established as an export-oriented economy at the time of 
colonization and the complex nature of pre-existing indigenous food systems; rural-urban migration, 
which is one source of disconnect between producers and consumers; and the pressure to continue down 
the road of industrialized farming through new technologies.61 Wiebe and Wipf also point to domestic and 
international trade policies that act as a significant impediment to achieving food sovereignty in Canada.62 
Finally, the country’s reliance on food imports, as well as the negative relationship between farmers’ 
incomes and increased yields, also generate difficulties.63 Many of these barriers are tied to the global 
orientation of the current agri-food system. 
One of the important features of a shift to food sovereignty in Canada lies in turning to indigenous 
knowledge of food systems in different regions.64 This knowledge may provide “invaluable insights into 
the kinds of transformations in values, behaviours and worldviews that food sovereignty demands,”65 
including an understanding of “seed varieties, growing patterns, appropriate and sustainable scale, waste 
management, cooperation and ways of living successfully in particular locations.”66 Furthermore, 
establishing strong ties between farmers and urban consumers is essential in order to move away from 
the agribusiness model and empower both producers and consumers.67 Finally, Wiebe and Wipf note that 
                                                
60 Toronto Food Policy Council, “Health, Wealth and the Environment: The Impacts of the CUSTA, GATT and NAFTA on Canadian 
Food Security” (Toronto: TFPC, 1994), online: 
<http://www1.toronto.ca/city_of_toronto/toronto_public_health/healthy_families/nutrition/toronto_food_policy_council/files/pdf/tfpc_en
vironment.pdf> [TFPC]. 
61 Supra note 17. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Darrin Qualman, “Advancing Agriculture By Destroying Farms? The State of Agriculture in Canada” in Wittman, Desmarais, & 
Wiebe, supra note 17, 20. 
64 See e.g. Dawn Morrison, “Indigenous Food Sovereignty: A Model for Social Learning” in Wittman, Desmarais, & Wiebe, supra 
note 17, 97. 
65 Wiebe & Wipf, supra note 17 at 8. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid at 9. 
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one positive trend for food security in Canada is the growth of urban agriculture, in addition to the 
development of “urban food charters, food coalitions and food policy councils.”68  
Hill and MacRae created their “efficiency-substitution-redesign” (ESR) framework in order to 
“[assess] strategies to support the transition from conventional to sustainable agriculture”; this spectrum 
can also be used to determine how much transformation is required in order to achieve food sovereignty 
in Canada.69 In the context of sustainable agriculture, these authors assert that efficiency-stage 
modifications constitute “shallow sustainability” while substitution- and redesign-stage changes fall under 
“deep sustainability.” 
In addition to discussing on-farm changes to promote sustainable agriculture, Hill and MacRae also 
propose ESR changes with respect to various institutions that affect this sector, namely governmental, 
educational, and agribusiness; they note that “this framework can be applied to both the analysis of the 
process of decision making, and to the contents of the decisions.”70 In this context, efficiency-level 
changes consist of lower-level modifications of existing programs or systems, which do not engender 
change at the higher levels. Systemic changes are more likely to take place during the substitution-stage, 
where entire programs may be replaced with new ones that focus on the desired sustainability goals; this 
type of change takes longer to implement and involves the participation of multiple actors within the 
institution. The ultimate goal is, of course, redesign: “it is proactive and can potentially generate 
permanent solutions to problems,” though these changes are much more significant, and thus take more 
time to execute. 71  
The adaptations necessary to move towards food sovereignty, as described above, are significant; 
they involve fundamental changes to our ways of knowing (by incorporating indigenous knowledge), our 
practices (ultimately shifting to an agroecological approach), and our relationships (both socially, by 
reconnecting urban and rural populations, and institutionally, by encouraging citizen participation in the 
decision-making process). Consequently, they all fall within the redesign stage; unfortunately, “redesign 
approaches are rarely implemented until institutions have first tried efficiency and substitution strategies 
                                                
68 Ibid at 10. 
69 Supra note 8 at 81. 
70 Ibid at 82. 
71 Ibid at 86. 
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and found them wanting.”72 It will thus take a great deal of time and dedication to reach a food sovereign 
state. 
 
ii. Food sovereignty and the Analysis of CELA’s Model Bill 
From the foregoing, a number of key principles stand out as central to the food sovereignty frame. 
First, all of the above demonstrates that there is general agreement that a shift towards localism (at least 
in thought, if not in action) is necessary to realize food sovereignty. This shift underlies the remaining 
principles: the use of sustainable agricultural methods, particularly agroecological approaches; the 
reconnection of urban and rural communities; and a participatory regime that empowers all members of 
the food system, including farmers, consumers, and indigenous communities. A Local Food Act for 
Ontario must also be flexible enough to account for very different communities across the province. 
 
  
                                                
72 Ibid. 
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3. CELA’S MODEL BILL 
 
Wiebe and Wipf argue that “Achieving food sovereignty in Canada hinges on making some 
fundamental changes in our domestic and trade policies, our ‘food cultures,’ our view of our place in the 
wider world, and many of our relationships to each other and our environments.”73 As a possible first step 
towards such a fundamental change at the regional level, in February of 2013, the Canadian 
Environmental Law Association (CELA) attempted to influence Ontario provincial food policy by drafting 
the Ontario Local Food Act, 2013: A Model Bill (“Model Bill” or “Bill”). The drafters explain its purpose in 
the following terms74: 
The Act’s purpose is to improve Ontario’s local food systems by 1) improving Ontario’s 
knowledge of the benefits of local food, 2) strengthening Ontario’s local food economy, 3) 
promoting environmentally friendly farming, production and processing practices, 4) improving 
local food distribution, 5) increasing public procurement of local food, and 6) inter-governmental 
coordination and public participation in local food planning and decision-making. 
 
These purposes are reiterated in section 1 of the Act.  
The following provides a general overview of the Model Bill, followed by a brief analysis of its 
relationship with the concept of food sovereignty. 
 
A. Overview of the Model Bill 
The Model Bill is divided into eight parts, addressing the six purposes outlined above. Part I 
describes the purposes of the Bill and how it should be interpreted, including defining key terms. This Part 
also provides the Decision-making Principles of the Act75: 
(a) food systems approach; 
(b) multi-functionality approach; 
(c) social justice and health equity approach; 
(d) precautionary approach; 
(e) ecosystems approach; and 
(f) sustainable development approach. 
 
                                                
73 Supra note 17 at 7-8. 
74 Model Bill, supra note 5, explanatory note. 
75 Ibid, s 2. 
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Part II outlines the administration of the Model Bill; it sets out the powers and duties of the Minister 
of Agriculture and Food, and establishes the roles of Directors, an Ontario Local Food Systems 
Committee, and an Advisory Council on Ontario Local Food Policy. 
Part III sets out the Bill’s “Local Food Strategy and Targets”; it states that both quantitative and 
qualitative targets must be established “in relation to (1) local food procurement; (b) local food distribution; 
and (c) local food education.”76 This Part also dictates the creation of an Ontario Local Food Strategy. 
The bulk of my trade analysis will centre on this Part, as well as Part IV, which prescribes the local food 
assessment that must be completed by the Minister and dictates the means for local food distribution and 
procurement. 
Parts V and VI of the Model Bill outline the formation of “Programs for Ecological Farming 
Practices, Goods and Services Markets, Healthy Food Production, and Processing,” as well as education 
programs in schools. 
Part VII of the Bill provides for miscellaneous matters, including public consultation and notice, as 
well as offences and penalties. Finally, Part VIII establishes the Bill’s commencement and short title. 
 
B. The Model Bill and Food Sovereignty 
My analysis of this Bill is rooted in the notion that attempts by local governments to become food 
sovereign are not incompatible with the major trade agreements to which Canada is a party; in order to 
complete this analysis, I must first establish that the Model Bill fits within a food sovereignty framework. At 
no point in the Model Bill is the term “food sovereignty” mentioned; however, considering the principles 
described in the previous section, the following demonstrates that this frame at least informed the 
creation of the Model Bill, whether directly or indirectly. 
 
i. Localism 
As the title of the Bill suggests, the premise of the Local Food Act is to reorient Ontario’s food 
consumption to food produced and distributed locally; specifically, the purposes outlined above are aimed 
                                                
76 Ibid, s 8. 
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at “improv[ing] Ontario’s local food systems.”77 The entire Bill is aimed at taking a local approach to food 
production, distribution, and procurement. Within section 3, the drafters define ‘local food’ as “(a) food 
produced or harvested in Ontario, and (b) subject to any limitation in the regulations, food and beverages 
made in Ontario, if they include ingredients produced or harvested in Ontario.”78 This approach to 
processing could be considered weak, as it does not require that all of the ingredients making up the 
product be produced in Ontario, nor does it provide explicit sustainability requirements for the means of 
processing. Section 3 of the Bill also defines a ‘local food system’ as “a chain of activities and processes 
related to the production, processing, distribution and consumption of local food.”79 The Model Bill thus 
proposes centralizing the food system in Ontario, contrary to the corporate food regime. 
Though CELA chose to define ‘local’ in relation to a political jurisdiction (the province), the concept 
is contentious, and there are a number of other ways in which it could be delineated.80 For example, in 
their study of Local Food Plus (a now defunct third party certifier of local food in Canada), Louden and 
MacRae found that using a provincial designation of ‘local’ would violate federal regulations, which dictate 
that either the food must be produced within 50 km from where it is being sold, or it must be “food that is 
manufactured, processed, produced or packaged in a local government unit and sold only in…the local 
government unit [or] one or more local government units that are immediately adjacent to the one… in 
which it is manufactured, processed, produced or packaged.”81 However, Louden and MacRae note that 
using 50 km to designate local produce “reflects a supply chain distance approach…[which] is limited 
because it assumes a direct marketing context for local; consequently, rules will focus on fruits and 
vegetables, the most commonly direct-marketed foods.”82 In other words, for foods that are not sold 
directly to consumers by the producers themselves, a 50 km radius is both exceedingly small and under-
inclusive of all types of food products. Conversely, Kloppenburg et al. assert that framing local in terms of 
a “foodshed” is more appropriate, and do not assign a particular distance requirement to that concept.83  
                                                
77 Ibid, explanatory note 
78 Ibid, s 3. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Fiona N Louden & Rod J MacRae, “Federal Regulation of Local and Sustainable Food Claims in Canada: A Case Study of Local 
Food Plus” (2010) 27:2 Agric Hum Values 177. 
81 Food and Drug Regulations, CRC, c 870, s B.01.012.(1). 
82 Supra note 80 at 185. 
83Supra note 14. 
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As noted above, the model Local Food Act proposes taking a “food systems approach” to decision-
making, which “means the recognition of all the processes that make up a local food system, from 
growing and harvesting food to its processing, packaging, transportation, distribution, preparation, 
marketing, consumption, management of food and packaging waste, and the recovery of nutrients within 
a region.”84 This approach reflects the limited supply chain interpretation set out above, where local food 
is that which is produced, processed, packaged or manufactured in the same, or neighbouring, 
governmental jurisdictions. Nonetheless, despite its claim to taking a food systems approach, the Local 
Food Strategy85 is based on targets that relate solely to local food procurement, local food distribution, 
and local food education86 – three possible endpoints for the food that has been produced. Thus, it seems 
that simply the step prior to procurement, distribution or education, must take place within the province – 
whether that step be production, processing, packaging or manufacturing. The Model Bill, therefore, does 
not appear to take any detailed account of the changes that must be put in place in order to achieve a 
food systems approach: the current formulation would allow producers to ship products out of the 
province for processing, and ship them back in for purchase, while still calling the food “local”; a more 
robust approach would combine the Ontario jurisdictional requirement with a supply-chain approach, 
requiring that all stages of the supply chain take place within the province (albeit, with some exceptions, 
such as where Ontario lacks the proper infrastructure; however, this could be corrected at the redesign 
stage). 
An even stronger definition of local, deemed “both conceptually legitimate and operationally viable 
at this stage in the relocalization process” by Louden and MacRae, would be a 160-200 km radius.87 
Though this could, perhaps, be a long-term target in the Local Food Strategy (at the redesign stage), at 




                                                
84 Model Bill, supra note 5, s 3. 
85 Ibid, s 9 (s 9(1) states that a Local Food Strategy must be developed within 18 months of the passing of the Act, and 9(3) says it 
must be reviewed every five years). 
86 Ibid, s 8 (s 8(1) states these targets must be established within one year of passing the Act, and 8(2) specifies that each target 
must relate to one of the stated purposes of the Act) 
87 Supra note 80 at186. 
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ii. Sustainable Agriculture 
As indicated above, the Bill provides a number of decision-making principles that must be followed; 
these principles include the use of a sustainable development approach and an ecosystem approach to 
decision-making. The former promotes “development that meets the needs of the present, without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”; the latter “means viewing the 
ecosystem as composed of air, land, water and living organisms, including humans, and the interactions 
among them.”88 Both of these approaches fit with the notion of sustainable agriculture and with an 
agroecological approach as described above: agroecological systems must be constructed in a way that 
is productive and which will sustain future generations; they also require a reconnection between social 
and ecological processes, thus demonstrating an ecosystem approach to agriculture. 
 More evidence of the promotion of agroecological systems can be found in subsection 1(1)(e) of 
the Model Bill, which states that one of the purposes of the Bill is “to encourage ecological farming 
practices that ensure the sustainability of agricultural lands.”89 The term ‘ecological farming practices’ is 
then defined in section 3 as ”agricultural land use activities that limit chemical and fossil-fuel derived farm 
inputs, reduce a farm’s carbon footprint, mitigate the effects of climate change, provide species habitat, 
conserve soil and water, or improve soil and water quality, and such other matters as may be prescribed 
by regulation.”90 Further, subsection 13(1) in Part V of the Model Bill states that one of the duties of the 
Minister is to establish and maintain programs that encourage such practices.91 Though not quite as 
robust as an agroecological approach, farming practices that follow these guidelines would fall under the 
efficiency and substitution stages of transition. 
Finally, the Model Bill’s preamble states, “the benefits of a strengthened local food system include 
stewardship of agricultural lands for the benefit of present and future generations.” However, though 
CELA links up the concepts of “local” and “sustainable” at numerous points throughout the Bill, it does not 
assume that local food will be sustainable: in a number of sections of the Model Bill, the drafters 
distinguish “local,” “local sustainable,” and “local organic.” Whereas ‘local food’ simply means food 
produced or harvested within the province (as described above), ‘local sustainable’ is “food that is local 
                                                
88 Model Bill, supra note 5, s 3. 
89 Ibid, s 1(1)(e). 
90 Ibid, s 3. 
91 Ibid, s 13(1). 
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and for which the production meets standards of environmental and social sustainability prescribed by 
regulation”; this is further distinguished from ‘local organic’ food, which has specified standards set out in 
section 3 of the Bill.92 While these three categories may be appropriate at the efficiency stage of a 
transition towards food sovereignty, as the province moves towards full redesign of the food system a 
long-term goal would be to maximize the amount of local food produced organically and in a sustainable 
manner, and to eventually merge the three categories. However, it is unknown how much of Ontario’s 
food system can realistically be converted into organic production; a study done in 2009 developed a 
comprehensive two-phase plan which would require fifteen years in order “to boost organic production to 
10% [of Ontario’s] agricultural area.” 93 Thus, though the authors note that this conversion would serve “to 
capture 51% of Ontario’s organic consumption,” 94 it is clear that a single category of ‘local-organic-
sustainable food’ is not possible in the foreseeable future. 
 
iii. Reconnection of Urban and Rural Communities 
Though one of the stated purposes of the Model Bill is “to foster a local food network through the 
development of relationships between farmers, local food system representatives, public sector 
organizations, schools, students, and the Ontario public,”95 the Bill lacks practical elements describing 
how these relationships will come about, except through the administration and public participation 
processes (described in the next section). In describing how local food distribution will take place, the Bill 
states that “the Minister shall…establish regional distribution measures including, but not limited to, 
regional food hubs that are locally developed, sustainable, and based in the community.”96 If regional 
hubs are, indeed, community-based, it is possible that they would serve to reconnect urban consumers 
with rural communities, whether directly or indirectly. 
Horst et al. describe a food hub “as a coordinating intermediary between regional producers and 
suppliers and customers, including institutions, food service firms, retail outlets, and end consumers. […] 
Services provided by a food hub may include and are not limited to aggregation, warehousing, shared 
                                                
92 Ibid, s 3. 
93 R MacRae et al, “Ten Percent Organic Within 15 Years: Policy and Program Initiatives to Advance Organic Food and Farming in 
Ontario, Canada” (2009) 24:2 Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 120 at 129.   
94 Ibid.   
95 Supra note 5, s 1(2)(f) [emphasis added]. 
96 Ibid, s 11(1) [emphasis added]. 
PURSUING FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN CANADA AMIDST THE TRADE AGREEMENTS  20 
 
 
processing, coordinated distribution, wholesale and retail sales, and food waste management.”97 
Similarly, the Model Bill states that a regional food hub is “‘a business or organization that facilitates the 
aggregation, processing, coordination, distribution, and/or marketing of source-identified food products 
primarily from local and regional producers to strengthen their ability to satisfy wholesale, retail, and 
institutional demand.”98 
There are different models for a food hub: though it can refer to a physical outlet (such as a grocery 
store or co-op), a hub can also be abstract. Though operations have suspended as a result of a lack of 
funding, Local Food Plus (mentioned briefly above) serves as an example of a third party certifier that 
also acted as a food hub by re-characterizing relationships between different actors (and including more 
of them) in the supply chain, thereby creating a food ‘web’ rather than a traditional food chain. Campbell 
and MacRae assert that Local Food Plus “operate[d] as a virtual market place, by helping buyers and 
sellers meet, either through direct communication or through its various public outreach strategies, 
including social media.”99 Thus, a regional food hub modeled after Local Food Plus – which formerly 
operated in Ontario – that focuses on transparent, trusting relationships and open communication, may 
help to reconnect urban and rural communities (even if only indirectly). However, Campbell and MacRae 
also note that, though “organizational resources” outside of the “traditional market mechanisms” available 
have, in the case of Local Food Plus, aided in the development of local sustainable markets and of key 
relationships, “physical hubs can create additional opportunities.”100 They cite problems associated with 
the actual distribution of goods from suppliers to buyers as one reason a physical hub might be desirable. 
A long-term goal of the Model Bill, therefore, may be to create physical hubs (similar to farmers’ markets) 
that allow in-person communication between urban and rural communities. 
It is important to note that, despite the lack of development of urban-rural connections generally, 
Part VI of the Act states that the Ministers of Agriculture and Food, Education, Child and Youth Services, 
and Health and Long Term Care must, jointly, “promote food, agriculture, and garden-based educational 
                                                
97 Megan Horst et al, “Toward a More Expansive Understanding of Food Hubs” (2011) 2:1 Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, 
and Community Development 209 at 224. 
98 Supra note 5, s 3. 
99 Alissa Mae Campbell & Rod MacRae, “Local Food Plus: The Connective Tissue in Local/Sustainable Supply Chain Development” 
(2013) 18:5 Local Environment 557at 565. 
100 Ibid. 
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activities in schools.”101 This type of education will reconnect urban communities to rural farms, as the 
experiential component requires students to attend farm tours and participate in the development of 
school gardens.102 Further, the Bill encourages “family and community involvement” in these educational 
activities.103 
 
iv. Participation of Farmers, Consumers, and Indigenous Communities 
Section 1(3) of the Bill notes that one of the ways in which the purposes of the Act (as outlined 
above) may be fulfilled is through the participation of Ontario residents in the planning and decision-
making processes set out in the Model Bill. The Bill requires the Minister to “establish a Local Food 
Systems Committee to provide advice to, and assist the Minister with, the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of actions taken to fulfill the purposes of the Act”104; membership of its Committee must include 
representatives from Aboriginal communities. As part of its duties, the Committee must meet at least once 
a year to discuss priorities for action in relation to the Act, as well as ensuring that public consultation 
occurs with respect to “matters relating to the purposes of [the] Act,” specifically regarding targets and the 
Ontario Local Food Strategy.105 The Bill also proposes the inclusion of farmer groups, Aboriginal 
communities, and various other organizations in these meetings, where appropriate.106 
The Bill further states that the Minister must create an Advisory Council in relation to the Ontario 
Local Food Policy, which will consist of 21 members appointed by the Minister.107  The make-up of this 
council ensures that all facets of Ontario’s food systems shall be represented, including members of 





                                                
101 Model Bill, supra note 5, s 15(2). 
102 Ibid, s 15(2)(a). 
103 Ibid, s 15(2)(c). 
104 Ibid, s 6. 
105 Ibid, s 6(2). 
106 Ibid, s 6(3) (see section for full list of Committee membership). 
107 Ibid, s 7. 
108 See ibid, s 7(2) for a full list of representatives. 




The Bill provides that the Minister must, initially, undertake an assessment of the status of local 
food production, distribution, purchase, consumption, and procurement in Ontario109; once this is 
completed, the Minister must “establish regional distribution measures including, but not limited to, 
regional food hubs that are locally developed, sustainable, and based in the community.”110 This ensures 
that distribution of food is flexible to meet the needs of the varied communities across Ontario. 
 
Based on the foregoing, in its current state, the Model Bill is a reflection of food sovereignty in 
some respects, though is lacking in others. First, it employs quite a broad definition of local, using 
provincial jurisdiction rather than a specified radius; this may not entirely make sense in instances where 
a community is based near one of the province’s borders, as food produced in the neighbouring province 
or state might, in fact, be produced closer to its consumption point. Second, the Act needs to establish a 
stronger connection between localism and sustainability, and a more robust push for urban-rural 
reconnection in order to truly embody a food sovereignty frame. Nonetheless, the provincial delineation of 
‘local’ and its current connection to sustainability are appropriate at the efficiency transitional stage, as is 
the push for ecological farm practices. Further, the educational requirements of the Bill are a very good 
step towards reconnecting urban consumers and rural communities. Finally, on its face, the Act appears 
to have a wide-reaching and inclusive public participation mandate, and its orientation towards 
communities means that it is likely flexible enough to embrace food sovereignty once other components 
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4. TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
Having established that, despite certain shortcomings, the Model Bill is rooted in a food sovereignty 
frame, I now turn to the tension between food sovereignty and international trade agreements. As 
articulated by Wiebe and Wipf, “Perhaps the most daunting concrete barrier to Canadian food sovereignty 
is the array of neoliberal trade agreements that dictate the terms for Canadian agricultural exports and 
food imports.”111 Terry Boehm, the former president of the National Farmer’s Union (NFU), further argues 
that international institutions and trade agreements, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and, in the future, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the 
European Union pose “real threats to food sovereignty and autonomy.”112 While, as noted above, there is 
some debate as to whether international policies and institutions have impacted decisions regarding agri-
food policy in Canada,113 Rosset criticizes the global shift of economic governance away from national 
governments towards the WTO and similar regional bodies, which are unable to provide safety nets for 
those who need them.114  
It should be noted that a food sovereignty framework does not invalidate trade altogether; rather it 
promotes trade as a means for providing what cannot be grown domestically, and for distributing surplus 
– the key is that the domestic population is fed first. As articulated in the Peoples’ Food Sovereignty 
Statement, food sovereignty “promotes the formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights 
of peoples to safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production.”115 If production is limited to what can 
be consumed domestically, and imports are limited to what cannot be produced in Canada, the system 
also becomes more environmentally sustainable (at least to the extent that the transport of food products 
contributes to agrienvironmental problems). Furthermore, according to the TFPC, the aforementioned 
properties of agroecological systems are limited by certain laws of nature, which are, on the whole, 
violated by trade regimes.116 
                                                
111 Supra note 17 at 10. 
112 Naomi Beingessner, “Getting to Food Sovereignty: Grassroots Perspectives From the Nationalal Farmers Union” in Wittman, 
Desmarais, & Wiebe, supra note 17, 43 at 47. 
113 See e.g. Skogstad “Canadian Agricultural Programs”, supra note 19. 
114 Peter M Rosset, Food is Different: Why We Must Get the WTO Out of Agriculture (Black Point, NS: Fernwood, 2006). 
115 Supra note 46 at 1. 
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Interestingly, Magnan argues that the rights of self-determination inherent in food sovereignty 
extend not only to peoples, but also to democratic governments; they exercise these rights through the 
enactment of agri-food policies and programs “that benefit domestic food producers and consumers.”117 
As a consequence, he claims that supply management regimes are legitimate means of protecting the 
domestic market under a food sovereignty framework, as they are “vehicles of self-determination and 
social protection for food producers.”118  
The reason that the adoption of a Local Food Act (as an exercise of food sovereignty) is 
problematic for trade is because it would create limitations on imports and exports; as such, it could be 
considered a “unilateral environmental measure” that would be “adopted in the absence of agreed 
international standards or rules, or go beyond agreed international standards.”119 Another example of a 
unilateral environmental measure would be regulations regarding product labelling. The most important 
international trade institution relevant to the adoption of unilateral environmental measures in Canada is 
the WTO and its associated agreements, including the GATT.120  
While the above discussion focused on all aspects of food sovereignty, the features that pose a 
serious threat to the trade agreements are the requirements that food be produced and processed locally, 
and that it be produced and processed sustainably (preferably with the use of agroecological methods). 
This chapter provides an overview of the trade agreements that pose a significant barrier to the 
development of local food acts – an example of a practical step towards food sovereignty – in Canada, 
and the various loopholes that might exist within them to allow for local and sustainable food chains. 
Once this overview is complete, the Model Bill is analyzed from the perspective of these loopholes. 
 
A. World Trade Organization (WTO)  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is “the common institutional framework for the conduct of 
trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments 
                                                
117 André Magnan, “The Limits of Farmer-Control: Food Sovereignty and Conflicts Over the Canadian Wheat Board” in Wittman, 
Desmarais, & Wiebe, supra note 17, 114 at 115. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Phillippe Sands & Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Law, 3d ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 806. 
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included in the Annexes...”121 It was created in 1994 at the end of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, as part of the adoption of the Final Act; this Act includes not only the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, but also annexed agreements, including the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT),122 the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA),123 the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement),124 the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (SCM Agreement),125 the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement),126 and the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).127 Each of these 
agreements, and their implications on the establishment of a Local Food Act, will be addressed in turn. 
 
i. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
The GATT was first adopted in 1947, and was established to serve as “the main international 
arrangement to encourage trade between states.”128 Though the WTO replaced the GATT Council as the 
institution overseeing international trade, “the GATT 1994 remains the central substantive agreement 
under the WTO umbrella, which is designed to encourage trade between WTO members by reducing 
tariffs and preventing trade barriers.”129 With respect to the creation of a Local Food Act, there are two 
Articles of the GATT (III and XI) that are potentially problematic, and one Article (XX) that provides 
potential loopholes that can be exploited. 
 
(a) Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation  
Article III of the GATT relates to National Treatment, and asserts that Member States must treat 
imported goods in the same manner as ‘like’ domestic products. This obligation prohibits States from 
                                                
121 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (entered into 
force 1 January 1995), Art. II(1). 
122 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 
Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 190, 33 ILM 1153 (1994) [GATT 1994]. 
123 Agreement on Agriculture, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Annex 1A, 1867 
UNTS 410 (ratified by Canada 30 December 1994) [AoA]. 
124 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 
Annex 1A, 1868 UNTS 120 (ratified by Canada 30 December 1994) [TBT Agreement]. 
125 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 
April 1994, Annex 1A, 1869 UNTS 14 (ratified by Canada 30 December 1994) [SCM Agreement]. 
126 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, 15 April 1994, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 28 (ratified by Canada 30 December 1994) [SPS Agreement]. 
127 Agreement on Government Procurement, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 
Annex 4B, 1915 UNTS 105 (ratified by Canada 22 December 1995) [GPA]. 
128 Sands and Peel, supra note 119 at 808. 
129 Ibid at 809. 
PURSUING FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN CANADA AMIDST THE TRADE AGREEMENTS  26 
 
 
imposing any national taxes or charges on either imported or domestic products, and from establishing 
any “laws, regulations [or] requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, 
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions,” in such a way that might favour and/or 
protect domestic products over imported ‘like’ products.130 Lester, Mercurio, and Davies assert, “In order 
for discrimination to exist, the foreign and domestic products at issue must have some degree of 
similarity.”131 They also distinguish between de jure discrimination - which “is apparent on the face of the 
measure” – and de facto discrimination – which “involves measures that do not explicitly differentiate 
between imports and domestic goods [but] may distinguish between different products, based on their 
physical characteristics.”132 More often than not, it is measures that result in the latter that cause trade 
disputes; however, even if the treatment accorded to imported products is technically different, the 
Appellate Body has determined “that different treatment must actually have an adverse effect on the 
‘conditions of competition’ for imports.”133 In other words, when compared to domestic products, the 
imports must actually be disadvantaged in some way in the marketplace. 
There are a number of provisions in Article III, the most important being: Article III:2, which refers to 
the taxation of “like” products of foreign origin, and states that taxes cannot be “in excess” of those 
applied to domestic products, nor can they be applied in a way that is contrary to the principles set out in 
Article III:1 (which states that taxes cannot be applied in a way that engenders protectionism); and Article 
III:4, which puts limits on the regulatory measures that can be taken by sovereign states. Through a 
number of dispute settlement rulings, the Appellate Body has determined that, due to the distinct wording 
of both of these provisions, they each contain different standards when assessing discrimination. In 
Article III:2, there are in fact two standards: the first sentence requires “[a] discriminatory effect test that 
looks at the overall impact of the measure on the group of imported products as compared to the group of 
domestic ‘like’ products,” but the Dispute Settlement Body will not consider the intent of the legislator.134 
Conversely, the second sentence of Article III:2 considers discriminatory effect and the objective intent of 
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the legislator; further, “[t]he standard of directly competitive or substitutable products is fairly broad and 
relies heavily on whether the products at issue compete in the market.”135 With respect to Article III:4 
Lester, Mercurio and Davies note that, in order to find a violation, “There must be (1) a ‘law’, ‘regulation’ 
or’ requirement (2) affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use of imported products that (3) accords ‘less favourable treatment’ to the imported products than to (4) 
‘like’ domestic products.”136 Finally, though “the Appellate Body has seemingly issued a clear and 
determinative statement that ‘likeness’ is about the economic competitiveness of products,” it all comes 
down to a case-by-case analysis performed by the Dispute Settlement Body once a violation has been 
asserted.137 
It is also important to note that Article III:8 provides an exception to the National Treatment 
principle by allowing government agencies to favour local producers in purchasing goods “for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production 
of goods for commercial sale.”138  
In the context of this paper, the regulations and requirements that a Local Food Act would impose – 
that a certain percentage of food be produced and processed in a certain way (sustainably) and in a 
particular location (Ontario) – would appear to violate Article III:4. However, a few academics have begun 
discussing whether this is an accurate interpretation of the GATT, and how legislation might be framed so 
as to avoid triggering a violation. 
Carsten Daugbjerg differentiates the ways that products can be defined for the purposes of trade: 
either by physical traits or by production methods (which may or may not have an effect on the end 
product’s physical traits).139 If a process and production method (PPM) has no impact on the physical 
attributes of a final product, it is called a non-product related process or production method, or ‘npr-PPM.’ 
Npr-PPM’s have what both Swinbank and Daugbjerg refer to as “credence characteristics”: the traits 
possessed by a product that differentiate it from other products on moral or ethical grounds, rather than 
physical ones; Swinbank uses the example of animal welfare policies in the EU.140 With respect to a Local 
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Food Act, the geographic location where food is produced or processed could be considered a credence 
characteristic; this argument appears to be the basis for the use of various naming rules in Europe. For 
example, the term terroir is used to designate areas that have “unique eco-regional features” or cultural 
significance,141 and has been applied to distinguish the origin of certain products in the marketplace; the 
most obvious example of the use of terroirs is in the sale of wine.  
As opposed to geographical location, sustainable or agroecological farming might not be 
considered an npr-PPM because the production method might change the attributes of the final product: 
for example, one could argue that a sustainably-produced carrot would not contain genetically-modified 
genes and would not have residue from synthetic chemicals, so may be considered different from its 
conventionally-produced counterpart. However, there is significant debate in the scientific literature about 
whether sustainable production actually changes the quality of a product, and there is no definitive 
research that would support the claim that sustainably-produced products are distinguishable in terms of 
quality. As such, both “local” and “sustainable” would likely be considered npr-PPMs. 
Erich Vranes asserts that, so long as there is no discrimination towards foreign products, regimes 
that are based on PPMs should be seen to comply with the non-discrimination rules of the WTO.142 
However, it is hotly debated whether products that have npr-PPMs are considered “like” with their 
conventional counterparts as per Article III of the GATT.143 The Appellate Body has held that “a 
determination of likeness under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent 
of a competitive relationship between and among products.”144 As such, Vranes points out that policies 
promoting npr-PPMs have been considered to be discriminatory because they change the conditions of 
the marketplace with respect to the competitiveness of other products.145 Swinbank argues that, though 
environmentally-friendly production methods (and other criteria related to processing and producing 
goods) have no connection to the determination of ‘likeness’ when it comes to international trade 
agreements, the reality is that consumers do sometimes differentiate between products based on 
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production methods.146 For this reason, and because of the externalities and costs associated with them, 
he argues that standards based on PPMs should be considered relevant. Read reasons that a disregard 
for production practices in determining likeness may, in effect, be seen as “reverse discrimination against 
domestic producers.”147  
Despite these arguments, the ‘like products’ doctrine enshrined in the GATT is based on objective 
characteristics, not subjective ethical ones, thus making production and processing methods irrelevant. A 
GATT working party concluded in 1970 that a determination of whether products are ‘like’ should be 
made on a case-by-case basis and suggested four criteria for making this determination: the ultimate use 
of a product in the market; the domestic taste of consumers; the physical properties of the product, 
including its “nature and quality”; and how the product is classified with respect to tariffs.148 MacRae 
claims that all but the last criterion “would have different expression for local/sustainable compared to 
conventional product”: conventional and local/sustainable products are not necessarily competitive with 
one another due to their disparate supply chains and consumer bases, as well as the fact that they “serve 
different economic and environmental purposes”149; thus, he argues, they cannot be called ‘like’ products 
in the context of Article III:4. 
MacRae highlights four WTO trade disputes that may have a bearing on Article III with respect to 
local/sustainable food, though he notes, “none of them address local/sustainable production and 
distribution directly.”150 In particular, the Dolpin-Tuna dispute “ultimately left open the possibility that 
Article XX(b) and (g) […] could be used to craft a WTO compliant measure.”151 Further, the Country of 
Origin Labeling (COOL) dispute between Canada, Mexico, and the US (primarily) “addresses local, not 
local/sustainable, but would appear to support the view that bundling local with sustainable affords 
protections that are not available when measures are just designed to support local production and 
processing.”152 
Though one of the above criteria is consumer-driven, the current WTO system as a whole focuses 
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on producers; Swinbank argues that it is consumer preferences that should dictate the rules of ‘likeness’ 
and proposes four criteria that, if established by a nation, could serve as an acceptable international 
standard for labeling products that were made through ‘negative’ PPMs (and which, therefore, lack 
credence characteristics).153 Essentially, he argues “negative attribute” labeling should be allowed if a 
country can show the following: that a notable segment of its population places significance on how 
products were processed; that certain process standards are expected; that these standards are applied 
to both domestic and foreign products; and that citizens expect that they will be alerted should these 
standards not be complied with.154 
Lastly, it is important to note that Lester, Mercurio, and Davies point out that in the GATT 
jurisprudence, there is some indication “that internal laws that regulate the production process, as 
opposed to the product itself, do not fall under Article III in relation to their impact on imports and are thus 
subject to the stricter rules of Article XI (and even if they do fall under Article III, they violate that 
provision).”155 Article XI is discussed in the next section. 
According to the Appellate Body, “[t]he broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid 
protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatory measures.”156 Though the ultimate goal of 
food sovereignty is self-sufficiency, it is, in principle, antithetical to free trade, as it promotes domestic 
consumption while only trading the leftovers; however, in practice, anomalies in the free trade 
agreements mean that they are not necessarily antithetical in practice. This is at the heart of this analysis: 
how can we make transitional steps to move towards food sovereignty within existing constraints, while 
recognizing that only certain aspects of food sovereignty may be possible in the current international 
environment. The provisions set out regarding National Treatment can be overridden by the exceptions 
set out in Article XX of the GATT, discussed below, which may serve as openings for the development of 
a Local Food Act. 
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(b) Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
Article XI of the GATT prevents Member States from placing quantitative limits on imported goods 
through the imposition of measures such as quotas or import or export licenses; this is a general 
provision that may be overridden by certain other provisions of the GATT, including the public policy 
exceptions laid out in Article XX (next section). In India-Autos, the Dispute Settlement Panel determined 
that the most important factor to consider in Article XI:1 disputes is “the nature of the measure as a 
restriction in relation to importation” and that it is not restricted to border measures alone.157 So long as a 
Local Food Act does not place any quantitative restrictions on imports, there is no reason to think that this 
provision would be violated. With respect to the argument that regulations regarding production 
processes violate this section, this would only be the case if the Act prohibited imports from States that 
did not use a specific PPM, thus having a discriminatory effect against certain countries; this was the 
issue in the US-Shrimp dispute, discussed below.158 
 
(c) Article XX: General Exceptions 
Despite the limitations set out in Articles III and XI, Article XX of the GATT provides a list of 
exceptions wherein a State can adopt measures that pursue certain social and political goals, so long as 
the application of the chosen measures does not amount to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade…”159 Of particular interest are Article XX(b), which exempts regulations “necessary to protect the 
health of humans, animals, and plant life”; and Article XX(g), which allows the creation of regulations 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and consumption.”160 The burden of proving that 
such measures are justified is on the State party seeking to invoke the exemption: it must first prove that 
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the measure fits within one of the specific sub-paragraphs; and, second, that it was not invoked in a 
discriminatory or disingenuous way.161  
In Article XX(b) (and other sub-paragraphs), the term ‘necessary’ has been interpreted to mean 
that there is no reasonable alternative measure available “that leads to a lesser degree of inconsistency 
with GATT rules”; conversely, in Article XX(g) ‘relating to’ simply requires that “the design and structure of 
the measure are closely related to the goal of the measure.”162 
With respect to Article XX(g), the Appellate Body has clarified that the primary objective of the 
measure must be the conservation of natural resources, and that there must be equitable treatment in the 
sense that domestically-produced and imported goods are both subject to the restriction.163 Further, it is 
the measure in its entirety that is examined, not simply “the discriminatory aspect of the measure.”164 It 
remains unclear whether Member States can exercise Article XX(g) to conserve natural resources in 
other sovereign states. 
Regarding the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate Body has emphasised a number of factors 
when considering whether there has been arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, including: whether the 
policy decisions had a coercive effect on sovereign states; the timeframe other States were given to make 
changes; and whether the measure takes into account varying conditions in different countries.165 Also 
important in determining whether discrimination exists is whether the measure is flexible and 
transparent.166 Lester, Mercurio and Davies suggest that the Appellate Body’s findings in US-Gasoline 
indicate, “that Article III requires only a discriminatory effect to find a violation, whereas the introductory 
clause [of Article XX] requires discriminatory intent as well.”167 The unilateral nature of a measure does 
not, in itself, mean there is a violation; rather, there must be some sort of logical connection between the 
objective being sought in the sub-paragraph relied upon and the reasons for discriminating between 
States.168 
Enforcement of the non-discrimination rules and limiting abuse of the Article XX(b) exception is 
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done through the SPS Agreement (see below); however, Daugjberg asserts that this Agreement does not 
cover npr-PPMs.169 As a result, MacRae notes that “the SPS agreement is unlikely to address issues of 
sustainability, including organic trade, since these are generally viewed to be npr-PPMs.”170  
Swinbank highlights the WTO Appellate Body’s ruling in US-Shrimp, which implied that PPMs 
related to environmental legislation may be allowed per Article XX(g).171 In that dispute, there was a 
challenge to a US measure that would only allow imports of shrimp that were caught using turtle 
exclusion devices (TEDs) as a way to protect sea turtles; the Appellate Body found that such a measure, 
if properly worded, could be justified under Article XX(g) as long as it did not infringe the chapeau.172  
With respect to measures taken in order to protect human health and other vital interests, Vranes 
also notes that the WTO Appellate Body has recently begun taking a less stringent position when 
inquiring into whether a measure is directly related to vital interests such as human life and health, and 
thus acceptable per Article XX(b).173 
 
ii. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) is 
applied in addition to the provisions of the GATT and deals with measures designed to protect human, 
animal and plant life or health – much like Article XX(b) of the GATT.174 The Dispute Settlement Panel 
determined in EC-Biotech that, with respect to animal and plant health, environmental protection is 
included under this agreement.175 However, as a result of their effect on the domestic food supply of each 
sovereign state, SPS measures can be highly controversial. The SPS Agreement grants states a variety 
of rights and obligations, and includes: provisions that promote harmonization and the use of international 
standards; provisions that necessitate that SPS measures be based on scientific evidence and a risk 
assessment (though Article 5.7 allows Member States to adopt measures provisionally in the event that 
there is not enough scientific evidence available to conduct a risk assessment); and a requirement that 
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measures are the least trade-restrictive and protectionist as possible.176 As was mentioned above, this 
agreement does not apply to npr-PPMs, and thus may not cover local/sustainable measures. 
 
iii. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) 
The original Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) was adopted in 1979 at 
the end of the Tokyo Round of negotiations; however, it was renegotiated during the Uruguay round and 
was split into two agreements: the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement, discussed above) and the new TBT Agreement.177 The TBT Agreement is concerned 
with the technical standards and regulations enacted by States in order to regulate the packaging and 
labelling of products; it was created to prevent any limitations that these may impose on international 
trade, while allowing technical requirements that are created for legitimate purposes, such as for 
consumer or environmental protection. The TBT Agreement differentiates between technical regulations 
and the standards that make up domestic food policies. The former are mandatory policies (enforced by 
the government) relating to production and processing methods (PPMs) and product characteristics, 
whereas the latter are voluntary measures such as those applying to organic producers. 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides for similar rules of non-discrimination and national 
treatment as Article III of the GATT: technical regulations and standards must be applied to ‘like 
products,’ whether they are imported or produced domestically.178 Further, Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement prohibits technical regulations that are “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create.”179 The TBT Agreement also 
allows similar public policy exceptions for regulations as Article XX of the GATT, and a non-exhaustive list 
of legitimate objectives is also contained in Article 2.2; these legitimate objectives include “protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.”180 With respect to standards, 
countries are expected to follow the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application 
of Standards, which is found in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.181 
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Vranes and Daugbjerg both discuss the debate surrounding the definition of “technical regulations” 
in the TBT Agreement, and whether it includes npr-PPMs; despite the prevailing view (especially in 
developing countries) that it does not, Vranes argues that the TBT Agreement covers npr-PPM-based 
measures, particularly with respect to eco-labelling.182 Should it not apply, Vranes nonetheless asserts 
that the TBT Agreement does not intrinsically prohibit standards and regulations that are based on npr-
PPMs, nor does the fact that labeling schemes are process-based necessarily prohibit them under the 
GATT.183 Daugbjerg points to Article F of Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, which permits “WTO member 
states to diverge from the general rule on standard setting” as a “potential loophole for using domestic 
organic standards as disguised restrictions to trade.”184 
 Additionally, Vranes suggests that, though the TBT Agreement does not explicitly include the 
GATT Article XX exceptions, it does apply, which MacRae asserts “suggests that using Article XX to 
justify supports for local/sustainable food is permissible.”185 
 
iv. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM Agreement) 
Another legal text of the WTO is the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM 
Agreement), which, with the help of Articles XVI and XXIII of the GATT, serves to restrict a State’s ability 
to provide domestic subsidies to producers. Article XXIII specifically prevents nations from diminishing or 
effectively quashing, whether directly or indirectly, any benefits other nations should be receiving from the 
GATT.186 
Per the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is defined as any “financial contribution” by a government or 
public body, including: direct or potential direct transfers of funds; foregone government revenue that 
would otherwise be due; purchase of “goods or services other than general infrastructure”; and payments 
made “to a funding mechanism” or “entrust[ed] or direct[ed to] a private body to carry out one or more of 
the type of functions” previously listed.187 Article 1.1(b) provides that the financial contribution must confer 
a benefit in order for a subsidy to exist (a financial contribution that does not result in a benefit to the 
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recipient is not a subsidy).188 Finally, the SCM Agreement requires that the payment have a specific target 
(such as a particular sector or industry), meaning that government spending that benefits society as a 
whole will not be considered a subsidy; whether the specificity requirement is met will be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.189 As such, when discussing funds that go towards environmental improvements, 
MacRae argues that if the wider public feels the benefits of certain measures, they should not necessarily 
be considered as “farm subsidies.”190 
The SCM Agreement lays out three categories of subsidies: non-actionable subsidies, which are 
those that States are permitted to grant; prohibited subsidies, including export subsidies and domestic 
subsidies, which are automatically banned; and actionable subsidies.191 The latter are allowed, but can be 
challenged if a Member can demonstrate that another Member has such subsidies, and that the subsidies 
have an adverse effect on trade; adverse effects include “injury to the domestic industry of another 
member; nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under 
GATT […]; [and] serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.”192 However, importantly, Article 5 
of the SCM Agreement “does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in 
Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.”193 
 
v. Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) came out of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, and contains 
three pillars: domestic support, market access, and export subsidies.194 This paper is concerned with the 
first, domestic support, which classifies different types of subsidies into “boxes” (reflecting subsidy 
commitment schedules) relative to how they impact, or “distort,” trade.195 As explained by Lester, 
Mercurio, and Davies, “[w]here a commitment has been made in the schedule for a particular product, the 
Member agrees not to provide more than the committed amount of subsidies. Where no commitment has 
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been made, no subsidies are permitted.”196 Further, they note that, unlike the SCM Agreement, the AoA is 
not explicitly concerned with “the trade-distorting effects of subsidies.”197 As set out briefly above, the 
SCM Agreement prohibits subsidies that are contingent upon the use of domestic goods over imported 
ones; however, should a Member set out support commitments pursuant to the AoA, domestic subsidies 
will be allowed so long as they do not cause adverse effects, as set out in Part III of the SCM 
Agreement.198 
Measures that fall within the “green box” are unrestricted and states are not required to apply the 
general reduction commitments to them; these are domestic support measures that have little to no 
impact on trade, and can be found in Annex 2 of the AoA. They must be funded by a governmental 
program, and cannot “have the effect of providing price support to producers”; there are also a number of 
policy-specific criteria that will apply in order for the exemption to apply.199 Included among the green box 
policies are: those governing food security and governmental services; direct payments to producers 
under environmental and regional assistance programmes (so long as they are not based on production 
levels or prices); and support measures that constitute less than five percent of a Member State’s value of 
production for either an individual product or its total value of agricultural production.200 
The “amber box” contains any domestic support measures that are more than minimally trade 
distorting, including subsidies to producers that are quantity-based and price supports; however, as noted 
above, price support measures are permitted for up to five percent of agricultural production.201 Between 
1995 and 2000, Canada was required to reduce its payments to amber box programs by 20%.202 Lastly, 
“blue box” supports are those that would fit into the amber box if not for the fact that they contain 
conditions aimed at reducing trade-distortion. There are no restrictions on how much governments can 
spend on blue box supports.203  
With respect to domestic food policy in Canada, it is important to note that supply management is 
not prohibited under any of the subsidy commitment boxes because it does not involve a direct payment 
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from the government to producers204; nevertheless, it is still considered by many to be trade distorting, 
and has been challenged in the international sphere. Though the Special Rapporteur claims that it is the 
countries, not the WTO, that impose conditions that impair supply management schemes, he 
nevertheless argues that changes must be made to the AoA from the Doha Round that allow marketing 
boards and supply management regimes to reach their full potential, which involves altering rules related 
to quotas and tariffs.205  
MacRae also points out that the limits the AoA sets on funding and subsidies do not apply to the 
MASH sector (municipalities, school boards, and publicly-funded health, academic, and social service 
providers) or NGOs; however, he points to Vranes’ warning that non-governmental activities may 
nonetheless be attributed to the state should the government provide any inducements or deterrents.206 
Further, MacRae notes that support for environmental sustainability is authorized under the green box, 
and governments have a relatively high ceiling for subsidies under the amber box (meaning spending can 
increase substantially).207 Finally, “when a specific program costs less than 5% of total farm income in the 
targeted commodity area, it is not counted” because of the de minimis provision; thus, many support 
programs could be created to fall outside of the AoA.208 
 
vi. Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
As indicated above, Article III:8 of the GATT provides an exception to the National Treatment 
principle with respect to public procurement. However, the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA) was negotiated during the Tokyo Round (revised in the Uruguay Round) and provides additional 
regulations for the procurement process, particularly with respect to the transparency in the tendering 
process; it is aimed at ensuring fair treatment for foreign suppliers. The GPA is distinct from the 
agreements described above in that it is plurilateral; while members of the WTO must comply with the 
aforementioned agreements, the GPA is optional, not mandatory. The Agreement covers not only central 
and subnational governments, but also public enterprises; further, it limits consideration of ‘offsets,’ which 
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are conditions aimed at domestic support (including local content requirements).209 However, the GPA is 
not applicable to contracts whose values fall below 130,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which, as of 
March 10, 2015, is equivalent to $227,590 CDN; for sub-national governments (such as the province of 
Ontario), the valuation limit is 355,000 SDRs, or $621,495 (March 10, 2015). The GPA also allows 
governments to add technical requirements to contracts, though they should be performance-based, and 
preferably founded on international standards; further, they should not reference a specific origin.210 
Finally, the GPA provides exceptions for small and minority-owned businesses, and for domestic support 
programs.211 
 
B. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) creates a regional trading bloc between 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States; it came into force in 1994, at the same time as the formation of 
the WTO.212 On the whole, the NAFTA contains provisions very similar to those set out in the GATT and 
other WTO Agreements (including national treatment and rules related to technical requirements); 
however, unlike the WTO’s GPA, the provinces are not bound to follow the NAFTA rules.213 Furthermore, 
under NAFTA, municipal procurement is irrelevant, and MacRae notes that “[t]he procurement rules 
between Canada and the US […] are still only applicable at the federal level for goods valued at more 
than USD$25,000.”214  
 
C.  Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) 
The Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) is a Canadian trade agreement between the provinces, the 
territories, and the federal government215; it entered into force in 1995 and is aimed at reducing trade 
barriers within Canada. MacRae points out that the AIT, Article 401.1, has similar requirements for non-
discrimination as the GATT; however, it also contains exemptions for “Legitimate Objectives” under Article 
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404, including regional development and environmental protection.216 Also exempt are non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and MASH sector contracts valued at less than $100,000.217 Though the AIT’s 
rules were formulated so as to reduce favouritism for local suppliers, MacRae notes that Article 504 
allows the establishment of Canadian content rules, so long as they are compatible with the country’s 
international trade obligations.218 Finally, he notes that the food sold to consumers by food service 
companies appears to be exempt from the AIT, since Article 507 provides that “procurement of goods 
intended for resale to the public” are not covered.219 
 
D. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 220 
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement has been negotiated between Canada and 
the European Union (EU); at the time of this writing, it is currently under review and awaiting ratification 
by both parties. It too has similar provisions to the WTO agreements, and incorporates a number of them 
into its text (for example, Chapter XX covers technical barriers to trade, and Article 2(1) of that chapter 
incorporates a significant portion of the WTO’s TBT Agreement). One area that is dealt with in a 
significantly different manner than any other trade agreement is government procurement, covered in 
Chapter X; the remainder of this section addresses this Chapter. 
Despite a few key exceptions (which are, nonetheless, diluted), the CETA will be the first 
international agreement to dictate the terms of government procurement at a municipal level; provincial 
procurement under the CETA also goes further than the WTO’s GPA “to include most utilities, Crown 
corporations, and the broader MASH sector…”221 Thus, experts at the Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives (CCPA) argue that the procurement rules in the CETA would likely be violated by any “buy-
local food purchasing programs at the provincial and municipal level,” jeopardizing food sovereignty. 222 
They also point out that despite having the opportunity to make reservations with respect to the MASH 
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sector, which would allow Canada “to adopt minimum local food requirements in publicly run institutions,” 
it “failed to do so.”223  
The non-discrimination principles set forth in Article IV of Chapter X include the requirement that 
“within Canada, [procuring entities must grant foreign suppliers] treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded by a province or territory, including its procuring entities, to goods and services of, and to 
suppliers located in, that province or territory.”224 Further, Article IV.2 states: 
With respect to any measure regarding covered procurement, a Party, including its procuring 
entities, shall not: (a) treat a locally established supplier less favourably than another locally 
established supplier on the basis of the degree of foreign affiliation or ownership; or (b) 
discriminate against a locally established supplier on the basis that the goods or services offered 
by that supplier for a particular procurement are goods or services of the other Party.225 
 
According to Trew and Sinclair, the language used in Article IV.2 of CETA “applies standard free-trade 
rules on non-discrimination to public procurement in ways that the GATT does not”226; in essence, 
paragraph 2(a) prohibits a procuring entity (i.e. the government entity giving the contract) from treating 
foreign-owned, though locally-situated, suppliers differently from those that are domestically-owned. 
Despite Trew and Sinclair’s assertion, it seems to me that both the NAFTA and the GPA contained this 
same restriction. Nonetheless, in order to determine the effect of this provision on incorporating a ‘local 
food’ requirement into the procurement process, it is worth examining how this process operates: a 
governmental body will make a call for proposals; in this call, there will be a number of criteria, including 
technical requirements, that a bidder must meet in order to be considered for the contract, and only one 
of these requirements would relate to ‘local food.’ For example, the criterion could require increasing the 
percentage of local food that must be used in order to fulfil the contract; at this point, there is no 
discrimination under paragraph 2(a) because the tender does not indicate that only local bidders can 
apply; rather, any party can bid, as long as it sources its products in the manner dictated. However, 
paragraph 2(b) prohibits different treatment based on where the actual good is produced (i.e. in which 
country). Trew and Sinclair state that, in effect, this means “Canadian municipal governments would be 
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prohibited from considering local content, or establishing a premium on local content at the outset in the 
request for proposals…”227  
According to the CETA, the above rules regarding procurement will only apply if the contracts fall 
above certain financial limits: for federal entities, the valuation threshold is 130,000 SDRs ($227,590 CDN 
as of March 10, 2015); for provincial entities (including provincial ministries and the MASH sector), the 
threshold is 200,000 SDRs ($350,138 CDN as of March 10, 2015); and for “all provincial and municipal 
government-owned entities of a commercial or industrial nature […] except for Hydro One and Ontario 
Power Generation,” the threshold is 355,000 SRDs ($621,495 CDN as of March 10, 2015).228 Trew and 
Sinclair argue that the provincial threshold of 200,000 SDRs means that many “municipal governments, 
utilities and MASH sector entities will be prohibited from adopting minimum local content requirements, 
insisting on local training quotas, or applying any other ‘offsets’”229 It is also important to note that these 
commitments were made by provinces on behalf of municipal governments, and are much lower valuation 
thresholds for sub-national entities than is required by the WTO’s GPA (which uses 355,000 SDRs). 
On top of the aforementioned monetary thresholds, the valuation rules set out in Article II.7 specify 
that a municipal government cannot “divid[e] a proposed contract into separate procurements” and that 
this applies to recurring contracts, which are considered a single purchase if they take place within 12 
months of each other.230 Unfortunately, this means that the procuring entity cannot allocate a number of 
small contracts between local suppliers for the same project in order to fall below the financial thresholds 
and uphold a local content requirement. However, Collins notes that when the GPA was revised in 2014, 
it included similar limitations in its Article 6.231 
Trew and Sinclair also note that, in the CETA, Canada has given up the right to “set aside a portion 
of contracts for minority or small businesses,” though it did reserve this right in the context of Aboriginal 
companies and communities.232 According to Collins, under the CETA both federal and provincial 
governments are able to exclude any “measures relating to aboriginal peoples” from the procurement 
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practices set out in the Act (though the division of powers may prohibit provincial governments such as 
Ontario from creating specific measures in the first place).233 
Despite the CCPA’s concerns, Collins argues that the “CETA is meant to control relatively large 
scale public contracting only, allowing governments to give preference to local suppliers in small contracts 
as they wish.”234 He also notes that governments can “continue to use procurement as an instrument to 
support community development and to assist small and medium-sized enterprises” and points out that 
the AIT’s monetary thresholds are, in fact, lower than the CETA’s.235 
Article IX outlines the “Technical Specifications and Tender Documentation” required under the 
CETA; paragraph 1 states that no specifications or conformity assessment procedures can be used “with 
the purpose or the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”236 Further, Article IX.2 
requires technical specifications be related to “performance and functional requirements, rather than 
design or descriptive characteristics” and that these specifications be based on international standards 
where possible; however, should a procuring party use design or descriptive characteristics, the entity 
must stipulate “that it will consider tenders of equivalent goods or services that demonstrably fulfil the 
tender.”237 Finally, Article IX.4 prohibits technical specifications that require any of a number of criteria, 
including “specific origin, producer or supplier, unless there is no other sufficiently precise or intelligible 
way of describing the procurement requirements…”238 According to Wood, however, “Buying ‘local’ food 
could be legally permissible if labels or technical specifications do not make reference to political 
boundaries… Thus, social and environmental criteria, such as carbon footprint limits, could arguably be 
defensible”; organic labelling and freshness are other examples of requirements that might be 
permissible.239 There is also an exception in Annex X-07 that states that the procurement rules will not 
apply “in respect of agricultural goods made in furtherance of agricultural support programs or human 
feeding programs.”240  
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Finally, Maltais also points out that CETA imports all of the GATT Article XX exceptions so that 
they apply to all Chapters of the CETA, including the procurement rules set out above.241 As such, 
technical requirements which are “necessary to protect the health of humans, animals, and plant life” or 
which are “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” may be permissible if justified 
under the Article XX chapeau.242  
 
This concludes the overview of relevant trade agreements; the following chapter discusses these 
agreements in the context of creating a Local Food Act, and analyses how CELA incorporated these 
trade commitments into its Model Bill (or failed to do so). 
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This chapter analyses CELA’s Model Bill in relation to the trade agreements outlined above to 
determine where there are opportunities for developing local food initiatives, and whether the Bill directly 
or indirectly takes advantage of them.  
First, the drafters of the Bill were correct not to include any provisions that would place quantitative 
limits on imports or require the use of import licenses; any attempts to include such restrictions in a Local 
Food Act would necessarily violate the trade rules. Consequently, Article XI of the GATT is not relevant to 
this discussion.  
Second, as mentioned in the previous chapter, MacRae believes that bundling local and 
sustainable initiatives “reduces the likelihood that such foods will be considered ‘like’ with conventional 
foods”; further, he believes that “the two main opportunities for supporting local/sustainable systems are 
targeted support programs and procurement rules and processes.”243 How these areas are addressed in 
the Model Bill is discussed in what follows; however, it is important to note that the Bill was written prior to 
the conclusion of negotiations for the CETA.  
 
A. Targets 
Section 8(1) of the Model Bill provides that “the Minister shall […] establish targets in relation to: (a) 
local food procurement; (b) local food distribution; and (c) local food education.”244 Subsection (2) requires 
the Minister to “establish qualitative or quantitative targets relating to local food”; these inform the 
development of a Local Food Strategy and the Minister must also indicate which of the purposes of the 
Act each target seeks to promote.245 Qualitative targets could include, for example, sustainability criteria 
related to freshness, organic production, and environmental performance; quantitative targets would likely 
include requirements that a certain percentage of the food procured and distributed in Ontario be local, 
local sustainable, or local organic. Consequently, it is likely that these targets would need to be consistent 
with the trade rules governing procurement and distribution (as addressed below), in addition to 
conforming to the National Treatment rules regarding non-discrimination.  
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B. Distribution Measures 
It seems obvious that a Local Food Act as a whole would, inherently, violate the National 
Treatment requirements under Article III:4 of the GATT (and similar rules in other trade agreements); this 
is the reason MacRae asserts initiatives must be framed in accordance with sustainability requirements, 
as opposed to localism alone. To reiterate, a violation of Article III:4 will occur when a law, regulation or 
requirement has a negative impact on “the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution, or use of imported products” as compared to ‘like’ domestic products, consequently according 
the imported product less favourable treatment.246 The key factor in determining likeness is whether the 
products are competitive in the marketplace, and “whether a measure modifies the conditions of 
competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products.”247 
The Model Bill provides that special distribution measures, including regional food hubs, will be 
developed for local food248; if these food hubs do not sell or distribute “like” imported products, thus 
according them less favourable treatment in the marketplace, a violation may be found. The Appellate 
Body in Korea-Various Measures on Beef determined that a law requiring that imported and domestic 
beef be sold separately (at least in separate sections of the same store, or in different stores altogether) 
had the effect of treating imports less favourably than domestic products; this was not because of the 
separation of the products alone, but rather the fact that consumers were favouring domestic products.249 
Thus, there must be an actual adverse effect on the foreign competitor – if a completely separate 
consumer base is purchasing local/sustainable food, then there is no competition, and thus no adverse 
effect on the imported goods. As set out above, MacRae argues that disparate supply chains and 
consumer bases, as well as their separate environmental and economic ends, mean that products that 
are both local and sustainable (npr-PPMs) are not in direct competition with conventional products. 
Further, even if they are competitive products, the fact that there exists a separate distribution centre for 
local food does not necessarily mean that the products themselves will be sold in different locations, nor 
does it necessarily have an impact on the distribution of conventional goods; I find it difficult to imagine 
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that the existence of such food hubs would have a negative or adverse effect on imports. However, if a 
bid required that these hubs were used in order to source food for procurement contracts, this section 
may become problematic; this is particularly true if the focus is solely on the ‘local’ aspect, and not on 
local sustainable.  
Since a violation of Article III:4 is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and not in the 
abstract, it is difficult to know whether one would be found in this case. As was discussed in Chapter 3, 
the actual capacity of the province of Ontario to produce sustainable and/or organic food is considerably 
limited and the consumer base for such products is relatively small. The Model Bill acknowledges these 
limitations: subsection 10(a) requires the Minister to undertake a local food assessment that includes an 
“examination of Ontario’s baseline agricultural production output” that consists of data related to how 
much food is produced, processed, distributed, purchased, consumed and procured locally250; 
subsections (b) and (c) require that limits “to production distribution and consumer markets” and “access 
by consumers” be identified.251 Only once this baseline assessment is completed will the Minister 
establish distribution hubs, which would reflect Ontario’s capacity. Nonetheless, even for products where 
Ontario’s production is limited, it is possible that imported sustainable or imported organic products could 
be affected by specialty distribution hubs; thus, there may still be a violation of Article III:4.  
Since the distribution measures are unrelated to the protection of “human, animal or plant life or 
health,” it is unlikely that they could be justified under subsection XX(b) of the GATT. However, because 
section 11 emphasizes that the regional food hubs must be sustainable, the violation could potentially be 
justified under Article XX(g); nevertheless, it would have to be shown that the primary objective of 
establishing regional food hubs is the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”252 Returning to the 
US-Shrimp dispute: it was not that the shrimp themselves were causing an ecological problem; rather, in 
the process of producing them, an ecological problem was created for the sea turtles. In the context of a 
Local Food Act, if the npr-PPM used to produce or distribute food is causing ecological problems, then 
the measure might be justified under Article XX(g); since the reasoning behind creating sustainable hubs 
is to conserve natural resources throughout the processing and distribution activities within the food 
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system. In US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body determined that, in addition to plant life and minerals, living 
animals (in that case, sea turtles) could be considered “exhaustible natural resources”253; however, it is 
important to note that, thus far, conservation policies have only been justified in the context of a select 
number of aquatic animal species and in relation to clean air.254 Though soil conservation and seed 
heterogeneity, for example, could potentially be legitimate resources in need of conservation, in relation 
to distribution, the protection of clean air may be the most effective argument to be made under the Bill by 
providing that “sustainable food hubs” require producers to meet specific carbon footprint restrictions. 
This will be discussed further below. 
 
C. Procurement 
The only direct mention of international trade rules in the Model Bill is in relation to procurement: 
subsection 12(3)(c) requires public sector organizations and ministries to “[draft] requests for proposals 
for food tenders that respect the terms of trade agreements to which Ontario is bound by agreement with 
Canada”255; subsection 12(4) similarly states that the entirety of section 12 “does not apply to 
procurements that are contrary to national or international trade agreements to which Ontario is bound by 
agreement with Canada.”256 From my analyses in the previous chapter, it is clear that the WTO’s GPA, 
the NAFTA, the AIT, and the CETA all provide rules on how the procurement process must operate in the 
relevant jurisdictions. These agreements all contain different valuation thresholds and apply to different 
entities; Table 1 provides a summary of the procurement restrictions and exceptions contained in these 
agreements, as well as the GATT.  
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- N/A - Art III Non-discrimination 
(national treatment) 
- Art III:8 Measures for 
government purposes not for 
resale 
- Art XX(b) Measures necessary 
to protect human, animal and 
plant life/health 
- Art XX(g) Measures relevant to 
conserving exhaustible natural 
resources 



















- Art IV.2 Non-discrimination 
- Art VI.2 Technical 
specifications should be 
based on performance and 
based on international 
standards 
- Art VI.3 No reference to 
specific origin 
- Measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or 
health 
- Set-asides for small and 
minority business or contracts 
for agricultural products made 
in the furtherance of agricultural 
support programs or human 
feeding programs  
NAFTA - Federal 
Government 
- $25,000 USD 
 
- Art 1003.2 Non-
discrimination  
- Art 1007.2 Technical 
specifications should be 
based on performance and 
based on international 
standards 
- Art 1007.3 No reference to 
specific origin 
- Programs designed to benefit 
small and minority business  
- Measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or 
health  
- Measures relating to goods or 
services of handicapped 
persons, of philanthropic 
institutions or of prison labor  
AIT - Provincial 
Entities 









- Art 401.1 Non-discrimination 
- Art 504.4 Cannot impose or 
consider local content 
criteria in favour of the 
goods or suppliers of a 
particular province or region 
 
- MASH sector contracts for less 
than $100,000 
- Contracts with NGOs and 
public bodies 
- Art 507 Procurement of goods 
intended for resale to the public 
- Art 404 “Legitimate objectives” 
including regional development 
and environmental protection 




- MASH sector 














- Art IV.2 Non-discrimination  
- Cannot divide contracts 
- Art IX.2 Performance and 
functional requirements, not 
design or descriptive, and 
based on international 
standards 
- Art IX.4 No reference to 
specific origin 
- Set-asides for Aboriginal 
companies and communities 
- Agricultural goods made in 
furtherance of agricultural 
support programs or human 
feeding programs 
- Art II.2(a) Procurement of goods 
intended for commercial resale 
- Art III.2(b) Measures necessary 
to protect human, animal and 
plant life/health 
- Potentially social or 
environmental criteria 
- GATT Article XX(b) and (g) 
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Bell-Pasht examines the space available within the trade agreements for local food procurement in 
Ontario.258 She argues that many of the limitations that exist within the trade agreements can be avoided 
through the careful formulation of local food procurement policies – they must simply be “fair and 
transparent and non-discriminatory.”259 Bell-Pasht suggests that incorporating technical stipulations into 
requests for procurement proposals (such as local/sustainable, seasonality, organic, and freshness) may 
get around trade restrictions.260 Additionally, she points to Europe’s use of geographic criteria as a 
possibility. She further proposes that policymakers focus on the MASH sector, which has higher monetary 
thresholds, and non-profit organizations, which have no valuation limits at all. MacRae also suggests 
“Using technical specifications of procurement contracts, related to the performance of the product or the 
process by which it is produced [PPMs], to favour local food systems development […] and to redefine 
value for money within procurement processes to include wider environmental and social benefits.”261 He 
suggests criteria such as: freshness; stipulating the use of regional crops; limiting distance travelled; and 
environmental performance.262 MacRae’s other suggestions include: the creation of rules based on the 
underlying principles that are typically used to create eco-labels (in lieu of creating a label itself); splitting 
up food contracts so that small local producers can benefit; “Creating procurements with set-asides for 
small and minority businesses or contracts for agricultural products that further agricultural support 
programs or human feeding programs”; taking advantage of the exemptions allowed for products 
purchased by the government that are not being resold to the public; and “designing programs to fall 
under thresholds, and paying particular attention to which units are covered by the agreement.”263 Though 
promising, a number of these suggestions may no longer be possible (or may be quite limited) due to the 
CETA. 
A prominent concern for critics of the CETA is that, though it technically only applies to 
procurements involving EU bidders, in practice it might inform all calls for tenders. To elaborate, where a 
State is a party to numerous bilateral or multilateral agreements regarding the same subject matter, it is 
up to that sovereign state to decide how to deal with any inconsistencies between agreements; most will 
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resolve any tension by following the agreement that sets out the strictest obligation. The state can, 
however, choose the lesser obligation, though by doing so it will open itself up to complaints when 
obligations to other states are not followed. The CETA applies to the MASH sector, has more rigid rules 
regarding the inclusion of technical requirements and granting contacts, and has lower monetary 
thresholds for its application; thus, regardless of whether there is actual participation from an EU bidder, 
subnational governments are likely to follow the CETA rules as opposed to other agreements, including 
the NAFTA and the GPA, which have lesser obligations.  
Following MacRae’s argument, there are two ways in which a local content requirement could be 
included in the Model Bill without running afoul of the trade agreements: contracts could be designed to 
fall below the CETA’s monetary thresholds; or technical regulations can be crafted so as to comply with 
the potential exceptions for local sustainable food. Each of these will be addressed in turn in relation to 
the Model Bill. 
 
i. Monetary Thresholds 
Subsection 12(1) of the Bill makes it mandatory for ‘public sector organizations’ and ministries to 
“aim to increase the percentage of their food budgets spent on local, local sustainable, or local organic 
food, annually until such local food procurements constitute a percentage of their overall food budgets 
specified through relevant targets.”264 With respect to provincial ministries, the GPA threshold is 355,000 
SDRs, the CETA threshold is 200,000 SDRs, and the AIT threshold is $25,000 CDN. 
The Model Bill defines a ‘public sector organization’ as: a provincial agency; a municipality; a post-
secondary institution; an education board; a hospital or long-term care facility; “a corporation described in 
clause (f) of the definition of ‘designated broader public sector organization’ in subsection 1(1) of the 
Broader Public Sector Accountability Act, 2010, or (h) another organization prescribed by regulation.”265 
Thus, a public sector organization would consist of the MASH sector, which is exempt from the GPA and 
the NAFTA, though will be subject to the rules of the AIT if the contract is for more than $100,000 CDN 
and to the CETA if the contract is for more than 200,000 SDRs (($350,138 CDN as of March 10, 2015). 
Thus, if a MASH sector contract is valued between $100,000 and $350,000, the AIT will be the only trade 
                                                
264 Supra note 5, s 12(1).  
265 Ibid, s 3. 
PURSUING FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN CANADA AMIDST THE TRADE AGREEMENTS  52 
 
 
agreement that applies, and there will be more options for including local content requirements. Further, if 
the contract is being given by a provincial entity, the $25,000 limit imposed by the AIT is also more 
restrictive than the CETA. 
With respect to the valuation thresholds set out in all of the trade agreements, there are two 
possible ways in which they might be interpreted: either the threshold applies to the entire contract, or it 
applies to the actual value of the “goods” that are being contracted for. For example, the ‘local food’ 
aspect of a contract will be significantly smaller budget-wise than the contract as a whole: in a proposal 
for a $1 million contract, only $200,000 of its budget might be allocated to food, and if only 10% of the 
food needs to be procured locally, only $20,000 of the entire contract would be for ‘local food.’ In other 
words, if any mention of the word ‘local’ refers to the contract as a whole, the valuation thresholds would 
be much more stringent than if each element is considered separately. Further, even if ‘local food’ cannot 
be distinguished from food generally, the value for the good itself remains far lower than for the contract 
on the whole. Thus, it is possible that using non-specific language would allow the local content aspect of 
a contract to fall well below the threshold in a number of institutional situations. However, as far as I can 
tell, this interpretation has not been put in front of any dispute settlement bodies, and therefore remains 
untested. 
Subsection 12(2) of the Model Bill states that a procurement contract made by a public sector 
organization or ministry “for the purchase of food may give preference to an otherwise qualified bidder 
who provides local, local sustainable, or local organic food, provided that the cost included in the bid is 
not more than 10% greater than the cost included in a bid that is not for local, local sustainable, or local 
organic food.”266 Though this subsection might appear to mandate a local content requirement, and thus 
violate National Treatment obligations, there is, in fact, no discrimination based on the bidders in this 
situation. In actuality, the requirement is simply that a tendering agency cannot select a bidder 
(regardless of nationality) who, though sourcing products locally, is asking for more than a 10% premium 
over a bidder who is not offering local, local sustainable, or local organic food. For example, if a bidder is 
sourcing from conventional producers at a cost of $100,000, a second bidder procuring food from local 
sources cannot ask for more than $110,000, provided that the rest of the contract is similar. 
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Nonetheless, it is likely that it would be impermissible to include food that is merely local, not local 
sustainable or local organic, as a technical regulation in the Model Bill unless the contract fell below the 
monetary thresholds set out in the trade agreements, particularly the AIT and the CETA. As a result, the 
criteria set out in the tendering process would need to exploit the exceptions that might exist for 
sustainable initiatives; these are explored below. 
 
ii. Exceptions 
(a) Contracts with NGOs and public bodies 
This exception only exists within the AIT: any procurement contracts given to non-governmental 
organizations and public bodies are exempt from the procurement rules; thus, as Bell-Pasht suggests, “it 
is also possible to create local food procurement policies that are exempt from trade agreements 
altogether,” including creating measures that encourage “non-profit organizations to facilitate procurement 
deals with the public sector.”267 Though there might be a way to structure a measure that will not conflict 
with the trade agreements if the NGO activity is unconnected to the bidding process, this is a potentially 
risky exception to use because, as Vranes notes, government bodies can be held accountable for NGO 
actions, especially if the NGO has been given direction through government regulations.268 Though there 
could be a scenario where local NGOs are committed to procuring locally, it is difficult to imagine a 
measure that could be structured to comply with the trade agreements. 
 
(b) Procurement of goods intended for commercial resale 
Both the AIT and the CETA contain an exception for the procurement of goods purchased for the 
purpose of being resold to the public. This exception is important because it would apply to food sold in 
hospital or school cafeterias, government workplaces, homes for the aged, and daycares, to name a few 
examples. This would mean a lot of food procurement is actually exempt from CETA at the municipal 
level, since most food purchased is for resale to the public. Thus, the Model Bill should stipulate that 
contracts for the procurement of goods being purchased for resale to the public contain a higher 
percentage of local, local sustainable, and local organic food than contracts that fall outside this category. 
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 (c) Aboriginal communities and corporations  
 All trade agreements described above contain exemptions for procurement for aboriginal 
businesses and communities (where these are the end recipients of the goods). As was argued in chapter 
2, a key component of a shift to food sovereignty in Canada rests on indigenous knowledge of food 
systems in different regions; since the establishment of a Local Food Act is an exercise of food 
sovereignty, it seems natural to integrate production and procurement in relation to indigenous 
communities. Because aboriginal communities are not significantly involved in commercial farming in 
Ontario, it is not realistic to craft a measure that requires a certain percentage of food be procured from 
indigenous communities; however, a low target could be used to encourage more indigenous 
participation. Regardless of the level of involvement of indigenous communities throughout the supply 
chain, the aforementioned exemption in the procurement process means that there could be a local 
content requirement for these contracts that would not violate the trade agreements. 
 
(d) Agricultural goods made in furtherance of agricultural support programs or human feeding programs 
The exception in Annex X-07 of the CETA, mentioned above, wherein goods procured from 
agricultural support programs and human feeding programs are exempt from the procurement rules, 
means that governments can potentially design programs that allow the market to better support 
producers rather than relying on hand-outs from the State. Though most human feeding programs are 
emergency aid programs aimed at helping the Global South, an argument could be made to include 
school food programs in Canada. For example, Bell-Pasht highlights a similar exemption exercised by the 
United States in relation to the GPA and NAFTA. Under this exemption, she states that the US passed a 
Rule under the 2008 US Farm Bill permitting “institutions operating Child Nutrition Programs […] to apply 
a geographical preference in the procurement of unprocessed locally raised agricultural products.”269 She 
also notes that geographical preferences such as this, which are “deemed to be applied in a manner that 
is non-discriminatory” serve as evidence that “the term ‘local’ may qualify as a legitimate technical 
specification criteria.”270 
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Subsection 17(3) of the Model Bill, which relates to Healthy Food and Education in Schools, 
stipulates that “A school may apply to the ministers for a grant award to… (e) “purchase food products to 
complement food, agriculture, and garden-based curricular for the purpose of student tasting and 
sampling of Ontario foods […and] (i) “offset the cost of buying local products for use in school cafeterias 
or, to implement, or improve existing school nutrition programs.”271 Though this constitutes a green box 
domestic support program (as addressed below), it could potentially be redesigned in a way to not only 
support local producers and further educational objectives, but also to serve feeding objectives through a 
Farm to Cafeteria program in a similar way as the US measure.  
 
(e) Social and Environmental Criteria  
Bell-Pasht observes that, in the UK, “Public bodies can specify in their contracts various 
sustainability criteria set by national or regional bodies or run by voluntary organizations. Certification can 
be evidence of compliance with the criteria; however, equivalent products that also meet the criteria must 
also be considered.”272 As outlined in the previous chapter, Article IX.2 of the CETA allows the procuring 
party to employ performance and functional requirements (preferably based on international standards), 
and design/descriptive characteristics so long as it considers tenders of equivalent goods. This Article 
thus creates an opening for environmental performance requirements, with a linking of local and 
sustainable. Article IX.4 also leaves room for social and environmental criteria.  
One environmental criterion that could be incorporated into the Bill is a carbon footprint 
specification: it could state that bidders must limit greenhouse gas emissions from the production, 
processing, and transportation activities to a certain amount in order to be considered for the contract; 
this would qualify as an npr-PPM. Transportation alone is difficult to justify, but limiting emissions along 
the entire supply chain may be workable; the result could be that local food is more practicable to 
procure.  
Another sustainability criterion could be a freshness requirement; for example, a Local Food Act 
could require that procurement contracts stipulate timeframes between e.g. when a product is harvested 
and processed to when it is distributed to the procuring party. Once again, this would limit the options 
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available to bidders as to where they source their food. In combination with a carbon footprint 
requirement, long distance travel of food would be unsuitable. 
The AIT also provides exceptions for “legitimate objectives” including regional development and 
environmental protection.273 Thus, a requirement in the Bill that procurement contracts support the 
regional development of organic farms, for example, might be workable; however, organic food would be 
subject to the TBT rules (as set out below). 
 
(f) GATT Articles XX(b) and (g) 
Recall that Maltais asserts that CETA imports GATT Article XX exceptions, allowing for the linking 
of local and sustainable in relation to environmental conservation and protection of human/plant/animal 
health.274 These will be explored more below, in relation to technical regulations.  
 
D. Targeted Support Programs  
MacRae provides six suggestions for formulating targeted support programs in order to reduce the 
probability of a trade challenge. First, he suggests that programs “adhere to the green box criteria, with 
framing based on GATT Article XX [and the] conservation of natural resources. To do this properly means 
linking environmental measures along the supply chain so that the product benefits are enhanced by their 
regionality” and which “allows for additional GHG reductions and energy use efficiencies.”275 Recall that 
under the AoA, direct payments for environmental and regional assistance programs are exempt from 
restrictions so long as they are not based on production levels or prices, nor are they price supports. 
Part IV of the Model Bill focuses on the ‘local’ aspect of food sovereignty and relates to local food 
assessment, distribution and procurement. As noted above, section 11(1) requires the Minister to 
“establish regional distribution measures including, but not limited to, regional food hubs that are locally 
developed, sustainable, and based in the community.”276 Though distribution was addressed above in 
relation to non-discrimination, it is also relevant to the creation of domestic support programs: in order to 
support the establishment of these food hubs, subsection 11(2) allows the Minister to “establish a funding 
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program to provide cost-sharing” in the expense; further, subsection (4) allows the Minister to “establish a 
mini-grant program to provide incentives for alternative distribution methods by farmers and food 
processors.”277 Generally, where a program involves cost-sharing, the sector also needs to provide 
something; thus, if these grant programs were set up in a way that prevents the funds from going directly 
to one firm, they would probably fit under the green box and not be subject to any restrictions. Section 
17(3), which sets the criteria for the awarding of grants for food education programs in schools (discussed 
above), is an example of a green box program that would serve to support local farmers through market 
measures without violating any trade agreements.278 
MacRae also asserts that amber box measures (which are mildly trade-distorting) can still be 
employed, so long as they account for less than five percent of the total farm income for that product. He 
further argues that import substitution programs should be developed, as they are not explicitly covered 
under the AoA, and thus could be placed in the amber box.279 Import substitution programs are those that 
aim to replace imports with domestic production – though potentially violating the National Treatment 
requirements, such programs could be established within the confines of the trade laws through the Local 
Food Act and the measures addressed elsewhere in this paper. MacRae also points out “even more 
expensive programs could still be designed and counted in Canada’s permitted amber box commitment 
because spending is significantly below the established limit, as long as a large number of expensive 
measures were not adopted at the same time.”280 Thus, the Bill could potentially include a clause 
stipulating the development of a program that subsidizes local organic and/or sustainable farmers as they 
break into the market (providing price supports) or that provides funding if a certain quantity or 
percentage of their product is organically or sustainably produced. 
MacRae asserts many actors should be involved in domestic support programs, with NGOs in 
particular taking the helm as they are not subject to the AoA; nor is the MASH sector. To take advantage 
of this exception, it would be beneficial for the Model Bill to incorporate a clause requiring the Minister to 
engage with non-governmental organizations in the development of domestic support programs. For 
example, it could require the Minister to partner with an NGO that specializes in the transition from 
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conventional to organic or sustainable farming practices; this sort of language would potentially exempt 
the measure from AoA coverage, and even if it does not, the program would likely fall under the green 
box because it would constitute an environmental programme, and is not based on price supports or 
production levels. 
Additionally, “the more effective the measure is at accomplishing its objectives, the less contested it 
may be” so measures should be necessary for the attainment of the goal.281 In other words, there should 
be a strong link between the sustainability goals and the domestic support program employed. Part V of 
the Model Bill pertains to the “sustainable” aspect of food sovereignty; subsection 13(1) states that “The 
Minister shall maintain, and establish where necessary, programs to encourage, (a) ecological farming 
practices; (b) ecological goods and services markets for farmers; and (c) healthy food production and 
processing practices [PPMs] by food producers and processors.”282 These types of domestic support 
programs would presumably qualify as falling under the green box. Section 13(3) provides examples of 
the types of programs and measures that may be established under subsection (1), including: “(b) 
financing; (c) tax incentives; [and] (d) grants.”283 Financing, tax incentives and grants may be prohibited if 
they are deemed to be price supports; however, if they are tied to sustainability requirements, they may 
be allowed under the AoA. They could fall under either the green or amber boxes; however, if the latter, 
they would need to account for less than five percent of the value of production (the de minimis rule) to 
avoid being counted as part of the amber box reduction commitments.  
Subsection 13(3) of the Model Bill also suggests certification and labelling schemes to encourage 
ecological farming and markets, and healthy food production. Certification and labeling schemes would 
likely fall under the purview of the TBT Agreement, and be subject to challenges under Article 2.1 (which 
is interpreted in the same manner as Article III:4 of the GATT relating to like products). This fits with 
MacRae’s suggestion that domestic support programs “should rely on private standards to drive change, 
which may be more suitable than state standards, unless an international body such as Codex is 
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developing an international version.”284 These will be addressed in the next section, related to technical 
regulations and standards. 
 
E. Technical Regulations and Standards 
Any technical regulations set out under domestic support programs and procurement contracts 
would need to comply with the TBT Agreement, including the ‘like products’ clause under Article 2.1. The 
CELA Bill refers only to the Minister making ‘regulations,’ not standards. Further, section 25 of the Bill 
also allows the Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations in relation to the governance of a 
number of matters, including the development of: targets; the Local Food Strategy; local distribution 
measures; and “ecological farming practices, ecological goods and services markets for farmers, and 
healthy food production and processing practices by food producers and processors.”285 However, since 
standards are not mandatory, they are less likely to be susceptible to a trade challenge; thus, it is 
potentially preferable for the Bill as a whole to speak of standards, not regulations. 
As noted above, because local and sustainable production methods do not leave any physical 
traces in the final product, they are npr-PPMs. As Daugbjerg notes286: 
Though in some respects ecological sustainability probably may be considered a legitimate 
PPM concern, in most specific situations, it would not, because most ecological rules in organic 
production are based on ethical considerations rather than on scientifically based risk 
assessment […] Similarly, standards associated with social and economic sustainability are 
based on ethical principles. 
 
Therefore, he notes that because there is no definitive “scientific evidence [that] demonstrates that the 
consumption of non-organic food threatens the public health,” measures that require the sale of organic 
food are unlikely to be justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT or the SPS Agreement.287 On the basis of 
Vranes’ assertion that the TBT Agreement does not per se prohibit npr-PPM based requirements, 
Daugjberg assumes that Annex 3, the Code of Good Practice, covers organic food trade; however, this 
means that any standards should be based on international standards if possible. These observations are 
also true of ‘sustainable’ food. 
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The Bill could include, when referring to domestic support programs and procurement, specific 
references to international sustainability and certification schemes or their equivalents. For example, 
where it refers to “organic” food, the Bill does not explicitly state that food should be certified organic; any 
references to organic food would likely be more acceptable if there was a specific international organic 
scheme chosen (preferably the Codex Alimentarius). Because organic certification is traditionally 
voluntary, it would fall under “standards” not “regulations”; so long as the Bill does not specify whether it 
is local organic or international organic, there would be no direct discrimination. As US-Shrimp indicates, 
a state can unilaterally require certain production and processing measures, so long as it also accepts 
imports produced through equivalent means.288 The use of Codex standards, in particular, would not 
violate the trade rules, and other provisions in the Bill will make local production more desirable (thus 
clarifying that local certified organic is the “best” option).  
If regulations were developed as opposed to standards, thus making them mandatory, they would 
likely need to be justified under Article XX of the GATT. As was indicated above (regarding both certified 
organic production as well as in the section on distribution measures), it is unlikely that the Article XX(b) 
exception will be workable unless it can be proven that human health/animal/plant life is at risk. However, 
the environmental benefits of organic are more definitively proven, especially lower pollution and higher 
biodiversity; thus, Article XX(g) is potentially useful if it can be applied in a non-discriminatory way. Recall 
that Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement prohibits technical regulations that are “more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create”289; the 
only regulation that might be justifiable as being “related to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources” would be one that has a carbon footprint restriction.290 The protection of the environment is 
also listed as a legitimate objective under the TBT. If foreign producers could modify their production and 
processing practices to limit emissions in such a way that transportation accounts for the majority of their 
carbon footprint, this may not be considered “more trade-restrictive than necessary.”291 However, since 
production is almost always the greatest source of emissions, it would be hard in absolute terms to make 
transport the biggest percentage of emissions. Further, due to the different processes and capabilities in 
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different locations, as well as the distance imports must travel, there would likely need to be different 
emissions standards for different importers. Generally, it would be more practicable to use standards in 
the short-term to avoid trade complaints. 
Finally, section 23 of the Model Bill provides for a situation where other Acts, regulations or by-laws 
deal with the same subject matter (local food, procurement, distribution, etc.) as the Bill, and states that 
“the provision that is the most protective of human health or the environment prevails.”292 This stipulation 
appears to be related to the GATT Article XX(b) exception and the SPS Agreement, but may not be 
relevant to the workability of a Local Food Act in relation to the trade agreements. If the Bill is rooted in a 
local sustainable supply chain that does not conflict with the trade agreements, any provision that is more 
protective of the environment would only strengthen the supply chain; however, it may be necessary to 
stipulate that the provision that prevails is the one that is “most protective of human health or the 
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This paper has discussed the potential for creating a Local Food Act in Ontario, as an exercise of 
food sovereignty, without violating the trade agreements to which Canada and Ontario are parties. 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the concept of food sovereignty, and established a set of criteria by 
which the Canadian Environmental Law Association’s (CELA) Model Local Food Act could be assessed. 
In Chapter 3, it was determined that, though there were some improvements to be made, the Model Bill 
was generally informed by a food sovereignty framework and could be seen as an exercise of food 
sovereignty. Chapter 4 then provided an overview of the trade provisions within the WTO Agreements, 
the NAFTA, the AIT, and the CETA that might prohibit or inhibit Ontario (or any province) from enacting a 
Local Food Act. Chapter 5 examined the CELA’s Model Bill from a trade lens, and provided a number of 
recommended changes; these changes, as well as the transition stage at which they might occur, are 
summarized in Table 2. The transition categorization is designed to identify the challenges of 
implementing each of the measures if they were to be included in a modified bill. 
Though it is clear that trade commitments do pose problems for crafting local content requirements, 
specifically because of their non-discrimination clauses in relation to National Treatment, these issues are 
not insurmountable. As this paper has shown, crafting measures in a way that emphasizes sustainability, 
in addition to locality, may provide more possibilities for local procurement and distribution. Through this 
exercise, it has become evident that, although these measures are possible in theory, it is much more 
difficult to formulate them in practice. While my goal was initially to suggest specific language in order to 
craft or amend the provisions of the Model Bill, I found that the case-by-case basis by which the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO (and similar dispute panels) operates meant that it was difficult to know what 
would be acceptable and what would not. Further, the Model Bill does not actually contain many 
regulations; rather, it provides that the Minister (primarily, but also other persons/bodies) either may or 
shall make regulations. As a result, it was complex to make amendments and suggestions, since there 
was nothing specific to build on, and only general recommendations were possible. 
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Table 2: Recommended Changes to the Model Bill 
MODEL BILL  RECOMMENDATIONS ESR STAGE 
 
General 
Modify any reference of “local, local organic or local sustainable” food to read 
simply “local organic or local sustainable”; without reference to sustainability, 
any local content requirement on its own is much more susceptible to 







The definition of “local food” should reflect a specific radial distance, rather 
than the province as a whole 
E 
The definition of “local organic” in section 3 should specify that organic food is 
that which meets organic certification under the Codex Alimentarius 
E 
The definition of “local sustainable,” currently refers to food whose “production 
meets standards of environmental and social sustainability prescribed by 
regulation” – it would be better to indicate that it is food that meets either a 
specific international certification program or that meets the standards set out 





Targets must not be so ‘lofty’ so as to violate the trade agreements; they must 






Incorporate a carbon footprint restriction in order to justify the potential 
discrimination arising out of separate food sales; this may be justified under the 
GATT XX(g) exception 
S 
Grant programs related to the development of regional food hubs must be 











Attempt to structure bids so that the monetary threshold applies only to the 
good itself, not the contract as a whole (though this will need to be tested and 
will likely be subject to a trade challenge) 
S 
Structure contracts to fall > $25,000 (so no trade agreement applies) or 
between $25,000 - $100,000 for MASH sector (so only AIT applies) 
E 
Set higher section 8 targets with respect to contracts for food being resold to 
the public in the MASH sector 
S 
Create a low and increasing target in relation to sourcing food from Aboriginal 
communities and companies (exempt) 
E – S - R 
Create a measure for Farm to Cafeteria programs similar to the US measure: 
“unprocessed locally raised agricultural products” for Children’s Nutrition 
programs 
S 
Create a measure stating that bidders must limit GHG emissions from 
production, processing, and transportation measures to a specified amount 
(related to targets) in order to be considered for a contract 
S - R 
Establish timeframes between when food is harvested and when it is to be 
distributed to a procuring party (in essence, a ‘freshness’ requirement 
S 
Create a measure that requires eligible procurement contracts to support the 







Incorporate a measure requiring NGO engagement for the development of 
support programs (for example, to help with the transition from conventional to 
organic or sustainable farming practices 
E - S 
In subsection (3), if financing, tax incentives and grants and grants are 
considered price support programs, ensure that they are below the de minimis 
level (though there is still ample room) 
E 
In subsection (3), specify that certification and labeling programs comply with 





Incorporate the Farm to Cafeteria requirement for procurement, as indicated 






Amend to read: “If there is a conflict between this Act or regulations and a 
provision of another Act, regulation, or municipal by-law dealing with local food, 
food education, ecological farming practices, food production, procurement, or 
distribution, the provision that is the most protective of human health or the 
environment, and does not violate any trade agreements to which Canada 
and Ontario is a party, prevails” (emphasis on amended portion) 
E 
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